Essays in Women\u27s Fertility and Public Policies by Javadi, Safoora
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee 
UWM Digital Commons 
Theses and Dissertations 
August 2019 
Essays in Women's Fertility and Public Policies 
Safoora Javadi 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Demography, Population, and Ecology Commons, and the Labor Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Javadi, Safoora, "Essays in Women's Fertility and Public Policies" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2199. 
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2199 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu. 






A Dissertation Submitted in  
Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 























The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019 
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott Drewianka 
 
My dissertation consists of three essays on the relationship between public policy, women’s 
education, and birth rates in two very different societies, Iran and the United States. A sharp 
decline in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran over the last three decades has put the country at 
the risk of an aging population. In the first two chapters, I detail the dimensions of changes in 
Iran’s TFR, examines some possible determinants, and estimate the impact of the government’s 
family planning policies on Iranian women’s fertility and marriage. I find that the policies 
mainly operated through the former channel – especially in rural areas, where the government’s 
family planning policies account for only 3 percent of the decrease in the marital fertility rate. 
In last chapter of dissertation, I use county level data over the years 2005-2017 to test 
whether easier access to local colleges affects teens’ birth rate. The difference-in-difference 
method was used to assess associations between availability and affordability of county-level 2-
years schools, and teens’ birth rates. Results show that younger teens (15-17) increase their birth 
rate by opening a new 2-year school, but older teenagers (18-19) postpones their birth decision. 
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Chapter1: Iran’s fertility declines in the context of socioeconomic changes 
 
“Over the past generation Iran has registered one of the most rapid and pronounced fertility 





A sharp decline in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran over the last three decades has put 
the country at the risk of an aging population and its consequences including a lower working age 
population, greater dependency ratio, lower national saving and investment rates, and lower GDP. 
Some scholars remarked that the TFR decline was due to the restoration of the government’s anti-
natal policy at 1989. This paper detail the dimensions of changes in Iran’s TFR, examines some 
possible determinants including the government’s family planning policies, and speculate about 
some of those determinants’ implications. 
 
1. Introduction 
The World Bank data indicates that among all countries around the world, Iran, has had the 
greatest decline in the TFR over 1980’s and 1990’s. In 20 years, the country’s fertility declined 
over two-thirds from 6.0 to 1.8 bpw from 1986-2006. Eberestat and Shah (2011) state that “this 
pace of change exceeded the tempo of fertility decline in almost all the Pacific Rim societies; the 
BRIC economies; and the other non-Muslim emerging market economies”. Since an intense 
2 
change in the TFR changes the country’s population’s age structure in the future, the UN has 
projected that by 2100, 30.9 percent of Iran’s population is likely to be aged 65 and older and 
country’s dependency ratio will exceed 80 percent. Thus, the recent level and trend in fertility are 
fearfully watched by the country’s policymakers, demographers, and economists for the signs of 
an upturn in fertility back to the replacement level needed to prevent future aging population and 
its socioeconomic subsequences. Some scholars pointed out to the restoration of the government’s 
national anti-natal family planning policy in the late 1980’s as a main reason of the fertility decline. 
Therefore, in 2006, in order to increase the TFR the government stopped the anti-natal family 
planning policies unofficially and in return by a pro-natal approach tried to encourage couples to 
have more children.  
Since effective treatment depends on an accurate and complete understanding of possible 
causes of a disease, this paper, with an economic viewpoint, attempts to determine whether and 
how socioeconomic factors may be agitated Iran’s TFR. The number of children a couple have 
will be determined through supply and demand interaction. Factors like age at the first marriage, 
the marriage rate, and prevalence of infertility affect number of children a couple could have if 
they do not use any mean of contraception (supply of children). While, factors including family’s 
income, the inflation rate, the housing price, and women’s education and employment status affect 
the demand for children which is number of children that a couple would like to have. Among 
those studies done on Iran’s fertility decline, Abbasi et al. (2009) and Saadat et al. (2010) had a 
wide-ranging investigation on possible cause of fertility decline in Iran. However, they mainly 
focused on supply side factors of the child market. In this paper, I examine effective factors on 
fertility from an economics viewpoint and mainly focus on demand side of the child market. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Since women are more involved in both child bearing and 
child rearing, section 2 describes a historical background of the government’s family planning 
policies, and the TFR in Iran, and how women’s status in society and within a family has changed 
over time. Section 3 introduces determinants of the TFR in Iran which comprises factors influence 
demand for children (family Income, inflation and housing price, and women’s empowerment, 
etc.), supply of children (age at first marriage, the marriage rate, prevalence of Infertility), and the 
regulation costs. Finally, Section 4 presents the conclusions. 
2. Iran’s TFR and the National Family Planning Policies in the context of socioeconomic 
changes 
Iran underwent remarkable changes throughout the 1960’s. The White Revolution, a six-point 
program of socioeconomic and legal reforms, was launched by the country’s monarch, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, in 1963. These reforms were intended to transform Iran into an economic and 
industrial power (Abrahamian, 1982). The White Revolution included the abolishment of 
Feudalism; the privatization of some state factories, such as sugar, textiles, and construction 
materials factories; the nationalization of forest lands; the introduction of profit sharing for some 
industrial workers; extending suffrage to women; and the foundation of a Literacy Corps1. These 
reforms were later complemented with the introduction of the Health Corps2, the Reconstruction 
                                                          
1 Because of this program, for the first time young men who had completed their secondary education were given the option of serving 
for two years in the Literacy Corps to teach children in rural areas instead of spending those years in the military (Sabahi, 2001). Later in 
1969, women also could join this Corps. 
2  The Health Corps was established in late 1963 when a fraction of the Literacy Corps were sent out to improve public health care 
throughout the villages and deprived regions of Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et.al, 2009). 
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and Development Corps 3 , free and compulsory elementary education, and additional 
socioeconomic reforms. Recognizing women's right to vote, as well as enhancing their health and 
education opportunities created a turning point for women’s social life in Iran, a country where 
women had previously lagged far behind men. 
Families were thus particularly affected throughout the 1960’s. By 1967, Iran had adopted a 
set of progressive family laws called the Family Protection Law, which provided married women 
with more rights within the framework of the family. This law created a family protection court 
that restricted the husband’s power in the family and provided married women with more legal 
protections, though these protections were very limited. For example, a man’s absolute right to 
divorce was curbed so that a woman could now initiate divorce proceedings. Furthermore, 
polygamy, which was unregulated before 1967, now required the first wife’s permission as well 
as the court’s consent; and the minimum legal age for marriage was increased to twenty for men 
and eighteen for women (Haghighat-Sordellini, 2010). Hence, as a result of the White Revolution’s 
reformist projects and the Family Protection Law, a woman's legal status both in society and within 
the family started to improve. 
In 1965, the 1955-1965 census indicated an annual population growth rate of 3 percent, a rate 
which would double the country’s population by 19884 (Moore, 2007). As Figure 1 shows, the 
                                                          
3  This regiment began in  1965, when a faction of the Literacy Corps were sent to villages to teach peasants new farming techniques and 
to help them build new roads and bridges (Hooglund, 2014). 
4 In spite of government’s concern, Iran’s  population almost doubled (1.9) by 1986 anyhow  because of political events. The program 
had failed miserably. 
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TFR in Iran was relatively high at 6.7 births per woman (bpw) in 19665. Thus, in 1966 the Pahlavi 
government formed a population committee to alleviate the population boom. In that same year, 
the government also invited the Population Council, an international nonprofit organization 
researching on social science and public health in developing countries, to make recommendations 
on how Iran might deal with its impending population problem (Keeny et al., 1967). By 1967, Iran 
was among the first wave of developing countries to initiate a national anti-natal family planning 
program (Moore, 2007). This program sought to change fertile couples’ knowledge, attitudes, and 
practices in relation to contraception. It intended to increase access to and use of modern means of 
contraception, particularly in urban areas. The government introduced new legislation and also 
adjusted existing laws to facilitate family planning program’s implementation. For example, 
restrictions on sterilization and abortion were repealed. Furthermore, family planning linked to the 
educational system. One-day sessions were held for public school teachers to introduce the 
population concerns; high school and university curricula were revised to consider controlling the 
size of family (Moore, 2007). In rural areas, the Health Corps women played an essential role to 
inform the villagers about contraception. However, the TFR only decreased to 6.4 bpw by 1979, 
the same year as the end of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. 
The new Muslim government immediately abolished the family courts and the Family 
Protection Law (Higgins, 1985), and stopped the current anti-natal family planning program. 
Instead the new government, attempting to inculcate Islamic values in the nation’s population 
policies, encouraged families to marry early and have many children (Fahimi-Roudi, 2002). Since 
                                                          
5 This rate was similar to those of most other developing countries of the time. The TFR in all developing countries, except those located 
in Europe & Central Asia, was roughly 6 bpw in 1966. In developing countries in Europe & Central Asia it was about 3.3 (World Bank, 
2012). 
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giving birth out-of-wedlock is legally and religiously forbidden in Iran, the legal minimum age to 
marry for girls and boys was lowered to 9 and 15 years old, respectively. Laws regarding marriage, 
divorce, abortion, contraception, and child custody were developed in strict accordance with the 
interpretation of the nation’s religious leaders. Married women’s presence and contribution to 
society depended upon their husband’s permission. Therefore, after the Islamic Revolution, 
married women’s status in society and within the family was restricted. 
In 1980, Iran and Iraq went to war with each other. Generally, during times of war having a 
large population is considered an advantage and the fertility rate increases to mitigate the child 
mortality. During the war with Iraq, basic goods were rationed in Iran and infants were entitled to 
an adult-sized portion of subsidized goods (Saadat et.al, 2010). This rationing system became an 
economic incentive to push families to have more children. By 1983, the TFR in Iran had risen to 
a peak of 6.52 bpw. In 1988, when the war ended, Iran had a 3.58 percent population growth rate, 
one of the highest rates6 in the world.  
In the context of a weakened and damaged post-war economy, a high population growth rate 
was not expected to result in a pleasant economic outlook, so Iran’s government reinstated an anti-
natal family planning program in 1989.  However, the post-revolution policy focused mainly on 
rural areas and was supported by the clergy at the national and the local levels. The 1989 policy 
encouraged families to have at most two children, to avoid pregnancies before age 18 or after 35, 
and to increase birth spacing. Pre-marriage family planning counseling classes became mandatory 
for couples and the government provided all families with free modern contraceptives through the 
public health centers. Even in remote areas, these services were carried out through the mobile 
                                                          
6 In 1988, based on World bank data set, Iran was the fourteenth country (2013) 
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clinics (Vakilian & Mirzaii, 2011). Iran’s first Economic Development Plan since the revolution 
(1989-1993) aimed to decrease the population growth rate to 2.3 percent by 2011, i.e. a TFR of 4 
bpw. To achieve this goal, in 1991 the parliament approved 58 billion Rials (in 2010 prices) 
devoted to the population control policies, and that budget sharply increased to 302 billion Rials 
(in 2010 prices) in 1992. Moreover, in 1993 parliament passed further legislation withdrawing 
food coupons, paid maternity leave, and social welfare subsidies after the birth of the third child 
for every family. Following the restoration of the anti-natal family planning policy, the TFR 
decreased from 5.1 bpw in 1989 to 1.9 bpw by 2002, well below the replacement level7. 
Currently, the reduction of the birth rate that was once crucial to checking rapid population 
growth turned out to be an economic and political crisis in Iran. Whereas a sharp decline in the 
TFR affects both the population’s age structure (see Figure 2) and the population level, the country 
is impacted by an aging population and its subsequently high total dependency ratio (see Figure 
3). In 2010, Iran had its lowest total dependency ratio since 1950 and the country’s population 
swelled among 20-40-year-olds —a bulge that will be quite prominent as they move into the 60 
and older age category by 2050. An examination of data from the UN reveals that by 2100, 30.9 
percent of Iran’s population is likely to be aged 65 and older. Figure 3 indicates that the total 
dependency ratio is high in Iran, both before the year 1990 and after 2060. However, the former is 
the result of high fertility, while the latter is result of the population aging.  
In order to prevent the socioeconomic consequences of the population aging (including lower 
labor force participation and saving rates, and slow economic growth rates), Iran’s government 
                                                          
7 A trend of Age-Specific Fertility Rates (ASFRs) from which the TFR is calculated reveals that fertility rates across all age groups trend 
in a similar manner. 
8 
started to urge couples to have more children in 2006. In this regard, the government introduced a 
baby bonus scheme in 2009 to encourage larger families. Under the new scheme, each child born 
in the current Iranian year would receive a deposit of 10 million Rial8 in a government bank 
account. They would then continue to receive another 1 million Rial every year until they reach 
18. Parents would also be expected to pay matching funds, at least 200 thousand Rial, into the 
accounts. However, the scheme stopped after one year because of budget insufficiency. In 2010, 
the welfare restrictions on families after the birth of a fourth child were repealed. In 2012, Iran’s 
supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, warned of the country’s aging population and suggested that the 
number of Iranian citizens should be at least doubled. The following year, the country’s anti-natal 
family planning program was officially eliminated and funds were reallocated to programs that 
encourage having larger families. These programs were included a broader range of policies from 
punitive to incentive. For example, in 2014, Iran's parliament voted to ban any permanent forms 
of birth control for men and women. Those involved in encouraging contraceptive services and 
abortions were criminally prosecuted. On the other side, the government extended maternity leave 
from six months to nine and introduced a two-week paternity leave. Despite the remarkable role 
that the government’s family planning policies played in fertility decline, there are some other 
possible determinants which have also affected the TFR. 
3. Determinants of the TFR in Iran  
Fertility can be influenced through three broad channels: demand for children, supply of 
children, and the costs of regulating fertility. “Demand” here refers to the number of surviving 
children and composition a couple would like to have and “Supply” refers to the number of 
                                                          
8 Approximately 1,014 current US$ 
9 
surviving children a couple would have if they do not regulate their fertility (i.e. by using a 
contraceptive or by seeking an abortion). The interaction of demand and supply consideration 
presumably determines whether and how strongly a couple wishes to have or to avoid a birth. 
Indeed, when the supply of children matches or exceeds the demand for children, then families are 
more likely to be more motivated to regulate the family size. However, translating this motivation 
into regulating fertility depends on such regulation’s accessibility, affordability, and desirability 
(Bulatao, 1984).  
3.1 Factors influence demand for children 
According to Becker’s (1965) theory of the allocation of time, children are home-produced 
commodities. Thus, like other commodities, the demand of children will change by socioeconomic 
factors such as family’s income, cost of childbearing, urbanization, child mortality rate, parents’ 
taste or preferences, education, and employment, ethnicity, and religion.  
3.1.1 Family Income 
Studies show that the direction and the magnitude of the income effect on fertility at the 
household level depends upon three interconnected factors: family wealth, gender of the primary 
breadwinner, and the main source of family’s income (Willis,1973; Mincer,1963; Schultz, 1994; 
Jones et. al, 2008). Willis (1973) states that as income rises, the price of child quality falls relative 
to the price of quantity, regardless of the source of income. In other words, the income effect for 
quantity is less than the income effect for quality, which means families prefer to invest on their 
children’s quality of life rather than having more children. Changes in the source of a family’s 
income also affects the number of children a couple would like to have by affecting the economic 
10 
opportunities that parents sacrifice to have a new child (Mincer, 1963). For example, an increase 
in a family’s income that comes as a result of a higher value of a woman earning more money 
discourages fertility, while an increase in income due to a higher rate of return to physical assets 
encourages fertility (Schultz, 1994). In fact, a higher wage induces the usual wealth and 
substitution effect, and demand for children is decreasing in income only if the substitution effect 
dominates the wealth effect. Finally, since child rearing is mostly female time-intensive, it is 
assumed that women have a higher substitution effect than men, who have a greater wealth effect. 
So, depending on whose income has increased in the family, we may observe a different result on 
fertility.  
Similarly, at the national level, the total fertility rate depends on three interconnected income 
factors: real per capita income, the income inequality rate, and the primary economic activity 
(Jones and Tertilt, 2008; Larry E. Jones et al., 2008; Hotz and Willis, 1993). A country with a 
greater real per capita income has a higher standard of living including more developed educational 
and health systems, so that the per capita economic growth rate and net fertility tend to move 
inversely (Becker et. al, 1990). Figure 5 shows the trend of real per capita GDP in Iran from 1960 
to 2014, which has been divided into three stages of economic growth. In the first stage, which 
covers the years from 1960 to 1976, real GDP per capita skyrocketed due to rising oil prices, so 
that in just 16 years real GDP per capita tripled. The second stage includes the years 1976-89 when 
the country was suffering from the inflation followed by the Islamic revolution and war with Iraq. 
In most of those years the country experienced negative economic growth, and real GDP per capita 
decreased 60.5 percent in 13 years. From 1989 until present is the third stage, when real GDP per 
capita has been increasing, even though it is still below the level in 1976.  
11 
The effect of real per capita income on the fertility rate in Iran could be explained by the 
Easterlin (1975) Relative Income Theory. According to this theory, a household’s relative income 
affects the number of children a couple would like to have. Relative income in Easterlin’s 
viewpoint is defined as income over “material aspirations.” According to this view, skyrocketing 
real per capita income during the first stage increased future parents’ “material aspirations.” So, 
when real per capita income collapsed in the second period, the result was a decline in fertility. 
 Besides per capita income, the distribution of income also affects the total fertility rate. 
Countries with higher income inequality tend to have a higher TFR. Higher income inequality 
lowers the average educational level (De la Croix and Doepke, 2003). Since less-educated workers 
have a higher birth rate than more-educated workers, the proportion of future unskilled workers 
goes up. Subsequently, lower wages for unskilled workers decrease their opportunity cost of 
having a child, which in turn generates a vicious cycle, where the poor stay unskilled and populous 
(Kremer and Chen, 2002). Iran’s Lorenz Curve shown in Figure 6 indicates that the income 
inequality rate has decreased from 47.42 in 1986 to 38.28 in 2005.9  Thus, the lower income 
inequality is consistent with the lower fertility rate over the last decades. 
 In addition to the level of income and income distribution, over time the transition from a 
traditional agricultural society to a modern industrial economy has led to a decline in the total 
fertility rate (Tamura, 2002). For example, in traditional agrarian economies, children had an 
essential contribution in the current and future of the family’s economy. Children provided their 
family with cheap labor force of production and in the absence of social security services, children 
                                                          
9 Gini index in Iran is to somewhat higher than other Asian upper middle income countries but lower than the upper middle income 
countries in other continents, especially in Latin America. 
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were a guaranteed future. So, having more children was an advantage for agrarian families. While 
in modern industrial economies children have lost those previous roles. Children are more cost 
than advantage. Figure 4 illustrates that over the last half-century, Iran’s services and industrial 
shares of real GDP per capita have increased by 6 and 17 percent, respectively while agriculture’s 
share fell by 20 percent. It is then possible that the decreasing fertility rate in Iran could be due to 
the shrinking agricultural sector. To sum up, these three income factors (real per capita income, 
the income inequality rate, and the primary economic activity) help explain Iran’s falling TFR over 
the last five decades. 
 
3.1.2   Shadow price of children 
In addition to income, the “price” of children could also considerably affect the demand for 
children (Deaton, 1986). This price is the additional income that a household must receive in order 
to have the same welfare level as it had before having an additional child.  
3.1.2.1  Inflation and Housing price  
A higher inflation rate induces the usual income and substitution effects on the demand for 
children, as well as on consumption of other goods and services. The inflation rate declines the 
TFR either by postponing the family formation or by reconsidering child bearing decision (Dettling 
and Kearney, 2014; Yi and Zhang, 2010). However, the demand for children decreases by inflation 
only if the elasticity of substitution between children and consumption is high enough (Jones et. 
al, 2008).  
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The decreasing level of fertility in the 1980’s in Iran is consistent with a higher cost of living 
due to inflation. Figure 7 illustrates Iran’s inflation rate over the last fifty years in comparison with 
other countries. According to the World Bank data, in the 1960s, Iran experienced on average 1.7 
percent inflation rate annually. The next decade started with skyrocketing oil prices, and the 
economic boom ended with an economic and political uncertainty. The country suffered on 
average 12 percent inflation per year. In the 1980s, the inflation rate highly averaged 19.7 percent 
annually and in the mid-1990s Iran experienced the highest inflation rate of 50 percent ever 
recorded in its history.  
Higher inflation raises households’ expenditures. A major component of households’ 
expenditure in urban areas which has a significant impact on family formation and a couple's 
decision to have a child is the housing cost (Dettling and Kearney, 2014; Yi and Zhang, 2010; 
Simon and Tamura, 2009). Considering children as normal goods, a change in housing price may 
affect households’ demand for childbearing differently. Since housing price is a part of the shadow 
price of children, it is supposed that a higher housing price negatively affects fertility among non-
homeowners. In other words, the “substitution effect” leads couples to postpone childbearing or to 
decide to have fewer children. A change in housing prices may also positively affect homeowners’ 
fertility due to a traditional wealth effect. When housing prices constitute a substantial portion of 
household wealth, then higher housing prices increase homeowners’ wealth, so that may lead them 
to either expedite childbearing or to have more children. Thus, response of the total fertility to a 
raise in housing price also depends on the rate of homeownership in an economy. Iran’s census 
results indicate that homeownership rates in Iran have decreased by 10% and 5% in urban and 
rural areas respectively from 1982 to 2012 (SCI,1976;SCI,2011). The Housing Rent Index (Figure 
8) also has increased more than 56 times from 1989 to 2012. Regarding Table 1 which indicates 
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that in 2012, 32.9 percent of an urban household total expenditure spent on housing in Iran, a rapid 
increase in rent and decrease in the rate of homeownership is consistent with lower fertility rate in 
Iran after 1983. 
3.1.2.2 Women’s Empowerment 
Child-rearing is mostly female time-intensive, and cost of child-rearing mainly consists of the 
present value of the time that a woman sacrifices to raise a child. Thus, a more empowered woman 
has a higher opportunity cost of giving birth. Women’s empowerment increases their contraceptive 
prevalence rates, lowers their fertility rate, and lengthens their birth intervals (Upadhyay, 2014). 
Higher levels of education and employment status are two main key factors that empower women. 
Table 1 summarizes some indicators of the relative position of Iranian women and men over thirty-
five years in the education and labor markets, and Figures 9 and 10 show specifically some key 
indexes in education sector. 
Figure 9 illustrates that value added (constant 1997) of education and its contribution in 
country’s GDP were low in the early 1960s. In line with Figure 9, Figure 10 shows that in the years 
1956-1966, the literacy rate in rural areas was much less than the rate in urban areas. Furthermore, 
women’s literacy rate was considerably less than men’s within each area. For example, in 1966, 4 
percent of rural women were literate vis-à-vis 25 percent of rural men. In urban areas, these 
numbers were 38 and 62 percent, respectively. During the years of 1960s and 1970s, in the context 
of the social development occurred in the country and rising oil prices, the value added of 
education as well as its share in the country’s GDP sharply increased. So, in 1979, 10 percent of 
real GDP came from the education. One reason of such a fast growth in this section was the 
country’s low literacy rates before 1970s, predominantly women’s and the villagers’ (See Figure 
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10). In 1976, one decade after the implementation of the first family planning program in Iran, the 
literacy rate among women was still half of men’s. However, from 1976 to 1992, the female 
literacy rate almost doubled, mainly due to the government’s active programs in eradicating the 
illiteracy in form of the Literacy Movement Organization.  
Table 2 shows that in 1976, female primary school enrollment was 76.7 percent of the school-
age children in Iran, which increased to 105.1 percent in 1992. Access to secondary education 
sharply increased between the years 1992 and 2002 for both females and males, rising 50 and 24 
percentage points respectively. In 2012, about 55.2 % of women and 55.1 % of men had completed 
tertiary school; the rates were considerably greater than the average of those in upper middle 
income countries. Women’s higher levels of education is consistent with a lower fertility rate in 
Iran either caused them to postpone the marriage or they have more knowledge about 
contraception. 
Table 2 shows in 2012, Iranian female labor force participation was 16.4 percent. This rate, 
considering the high speed of educational improvement, is low. Based on World Bank data, in 
2013 Iran had the 6th lowest female labor force participation in the world, while female labor force 
participation in the world averaged 50.3 percent. Thus, despite a big jump in women’s education, 
and since the female labor force participation rate is still much lower than in other upper middle-
income countries, we can say that the higher opportunity cost of childbearing in the form of 
mothers’ wage likely did not play a major role in decreasing Iran’s fertility. 
 However, education not only affects fertility by changing the opportunity cost of having a 
child, but also through other channels. For example, education may provide better knowledge of 
contraceptives (Monstad and Salvanes, 2008) and may decrease fertility by increasing the 
contraceptive self-efficacy (Longmore, 2003). 
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3.1.3 Rural-Urban Migration 
Rural to urban migration within a country may influence the timing and pace of the decline in 
total fertility over the country. Indeed, women’s fertility rate in urban areas has consistently been 
lower than in rural (United Nations, 2001). In rural areas children constitute a noticeable 
proportion of the agricultural labor force, and having more children is thus an economic advantage. 
In urban areas, a simple cost-benefit analysis shifts families’ preferences to substitute quality for 
quantity. Thus, compared to rural areas, in urban areas there are lower economic contributions of 
children and higher costs of their upbringing and education, so having more children is 
economically disadvantageous. 
Apart from economic reasons, urbanization is also a proxy for changes in social norms and 
gender roles, which generate a preference for smaller families (Guo et. al, 2012). Women 
progressively find themselves free from household obligations and their new economic roles are 
less compatible with childbearing. In other words, higher levels of wages, improvement in 
women’s empowerment, and higher cost of childcare decrease the fertility rate by increasing 
opportunity costs of having a child. As Figure 11 confirms that TFR and urbanization have been 
inversely related in Iran over the last 50 years. The World Bank data indicates that 54.3 percent of 
the population had been urban in 1986, the number which grew to 68.4 percent of the total 
population in 2006. During the same years, the TFR in rural areas decreased from 6.5 to 2.10 and 
in urban areas from 4.9 to 1.7 (Abbasi et. al, 2009).  
I used the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique to identify and quantify the effect of 
change in urbanization on Iran’s TFR. The country’s TFR is weighted average of the TFR in rural 
and urban areas: 
𝑇𝐹𝑅𝐶
𝐾 = 𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑈
𝐾 ∗ 𝑢𝐾 + 𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑅





𝐾 are the country’s TFR, TFR in urban areas, and TFR in rural 
areas at time K, respectively. 𝑢𝐾 is percentage of the nation living in urban areas at time K, and 
𝑟𝐾 is the share of those living in rural areas at time K. Thus, change in the share of people living 
within each region and their birth rate affect the country’s TFR together.  
 
∆𝑇𝐹𝑅𝐶 = ∑ (𝑢
𝐾 − 𝑟𝐾) ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑈




𝐾)                                     (2) 
 
The first term in equation (2) specifies how urbanization has been responsible for fertility 
decline and the second term clarifies effect of change in region-specific birth rates in fertility 
decline. Table 3 shows results of the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of TFR in Iran by region 
from 1970’s to 2000’s. It indicates that except during the years of 1972-1982, in which 
urbanization’s effect was actually in the opposite direction, about 5% of change in country’s TFR 
has come from the urbanization. For example, during the years 1986-2006 the country experienced 
3.81 bpw decline in TFR, 3.67 bpw of the decrease in women’s fertility is due to change in region-
specific birth rates, and just 0.14 bpw is due to changes in urbanization.  
3.1.4 Child Mortality Rate 
According to the Demographic Transition Theory, a higher childhood mortality rate 
contributes to parental desires to have many children, as households seek to replace deceased 
children or to insure against those who may die. From economic viewpoint, there is a quantity-
quality tradeoff for children (Becker, 1960). In the presence of a high mortality rate, investments 
in children's human capital will be less attractive because it decreases the expected time horizon 
over which such capital can be used (Angeles, 2010). In other words, parents would prefer to invest 
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in number of children rather than their human capital. However, a decreasing mortality rate induces 
parents to move from quantity to quality, decreasing the total fertility rate. 
To improve the health and life chances of the rural population in Iran, rural health facilities 
began to be constructed before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, but accelerated in the mid-1980s, 
closely timed with fertility decline (Salehi-Isfahani et.al 2009). Moreover, Health Corps workers 
visited the villages frequently and held public forums that taught proper household hygiene, how 
to avoid food contamination, and so forth (Hooglund, 2014) which would decrease the child 
mortality rates. In 1967, Iran with a mortality rate of 192.4 per 1,000 birth was the tenth highest 
country in the world among 148 countries. Over the last five decades in Iran, the infant mortality 
rate dropped from 101.1 to 44.1, then to 14.4 per 1000 live birth in 1976, 1989, and 2013(World 
Bank). Hence, a decreasing child mortality rate could partially explain a lower fertility rate. 
3.2 Factors influence supply of children  
Natural fertility reflects biology, culture, the age of marriage, frequency of intercourse, and 
duration of postpartum infecundability. These are among the main factors that influence the supply 
of children. Marriage and divorce rates are particularly important factors in countries like Iran 
where out-of-wedlock childbearing is not acceptable. 
3.2.1 Age at first marriage 
In the absence of any effective contraceptive, the age at first marriage and first birth influence 
the total number of children a woman bears during her reproductive period. The age at the first 
marriage is negatively affected the number of children a woman is likely to have. As figure 12 
indicates, while many countries have experienced decreases in fertility when the age at marriage 
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has risen, the experience in many other countries casts doubt on the importance of this mechanism. 
Over thirty years from 1980 to 2010, many countries like Iran, Tunisia, Republic of Korea, and 
Costa Rica had a higher average age at the first marriage and lower TFR.  
Women’s higher average age at the first marriage in Iran could explain the country’s 
decreasing TFR. Table 4 represents the trend of average age at first marriage in Iran from 1956-
2011. In 2011 the female average ages at first marriage were 23.0 and 23.6 in rural and urban areas 
respectively. These average ages have increased gradually between 1966-2011, in rural areas by 
5.1 years and in urban areas by 4.6 years. In addition to the age at the first marriage, the marriage 
rate also matters. The UN data shown in Figure 13 indicates that the probability of marriage has 
decreased in Iran for women in their twenties. Women are respectively 12.8, 21.3, 16.8, and 10.9 
percent more likely to be single in the age of 15-19, 20-24,25-29, and 30-34 in 2011 than they 
were in 1986. However, since the probability of being single at older ages has not changed, we can 
infer it indicates that Iranian women have been postponing marriage into their thirties and forties, 
rather than avoiding marriage entirely. Women’s marriage in older age decreases the chance and 
number of their pregnancies. Besides the marriage rate, divorce rate also matters for fertility rate. 
Figure 14 shows that over the years 1966 to 2011 Iran experienced the lowest divorce rate across 
all age ranges in 1996. Recently, the divorce rate has been increased particularly among women 
between the ages 30-50. 
 3.2.2 Prevalence of Infertility 
Obviously, infertility has a dampening effect on TFR and the supply of children. Thus, 
improvements in the ability to bear children could be considered as a pro-natal tool. For example, 
Frank (1983) estimated that a reduction in infertility in sub-Saharan Africa to “normal” levels 
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would increase fertility in that region by 15 percent, and Larsen and Menken (1989) found that the 
total fertility rate would rise from 5.5 to 7.3 in the absence of sterility in Cameroon, a country with 
an unusually high level of infertility (WHO, 2004).  
Maya N. Mascarenhas et al. (2012) analyzed household survey data from 277 demographic 
and reproductive health surveys in 190 countries and territories to reveal global patterns and trends 
in infertility. They considered infertility as an inability to have a live birth after a five-year 
exposure to the pregnancy risk10 and found that the primary infertility rate for women seeking a 
child in these countries investigated was on average 1.9%, and the secondary infertility rate was 
10.5% in 2010. Results of their research in table 5 shows that in 2010, among child-seeking Iranian 
women 20–44 years of age who were exposed to the risk of pregnancy for 5 years, 2.5% (95% 
uncertainty interval 1.3%, 4.3%) were unable to attain a live birth (primary infertility). Out of 
women who had had at least one live birth and were exposed to the risk of pregnancy, 6.2% (3.3%, 
10.7%) were unable to have another child (secondary infertility). Although their results indicate a 
rather low infertility rate in Iran, it is important to note that an infertility measure based on ability 
to become pregnant (rather than having a live birth) may show different levels of infertility, and 
using an exposure period shorter than the five years would produce higher rates of infertility. For 
instance, Akhondi et.al (2013) used data from a 2011 national survey of Iranian women aged 20-
40 years to investigate the prevalence of infertility. They interviewed 17,187 women with the mean 
age of marriage of 20.1 years to figure out their fertility history. They define, primary infertility as 
                                                          
10 Inability to conceive within two years of exposure to pregnancy is the epidemiological definition of infertility recommended by 
the World Health Organization. Also, a typical clinical definitions of infertility is a failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 or more 
months of trying (WHO, 1975; WHO, 2001). 
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an inability to conceive after one year of unprotected intercourse, and by that definition they found 
a relatively high primary infertility rate of 20.2 percent in Iran. 
 Unfortunately, existing studies have not estimated the effect of infertility on Iran’s TFR. 
Since the evidence is mixed on the magnitudes of Iran’s fertility rate, it is at least possible that this 
has been an important factor behind the trend toward lower TFR. 
3.3 Regulation Costs: Rise in Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 
The contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) is a key factor influencing the TFR in many 
developing countries like Iran. Bongaarts et al. (2012) explained that 15-17 percentage points 
increase in the contraceptive prevalence rate is required to reduce the TFR by one birth per woman. 
The United Nation data for 2014 in Figure 15 also indicate a negative relationship between the 
contraceptive prevalence rate and TFR. A greater decrease in the CPR relates to a larger TFR 
decline (Figure 16).   
As Figure 17 shows, the CPR in Iran, regardless of the government’s family planning policy, 
has always had an upward trend over the last four decades. However, in the early 1990s, when the 
national anti-natal family planning policy was restored, the CPR accelerated. In 1989, Iran’s 
Health Ministry launched a campaign across the country to introduce contraceptives - pills, 
condoms, IUDs, implants, tubal ligations, and vasectomies-and provided free or subsidized 
condoms and other contraceptives to families (Moore, 2007). In the meantime, the High Judicial 
Council declared that sterilization of men and women was not against the Islamic principles or 
existing laws, which increased the desirability and acceptability of sterilization as a method of 
family planning (Roudi-Fahimi, 2002). The government’s attempts in promulgating contraception 
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within families, especially in rural areas, and increasing its accessibility has been considered as 
one of the main reasons for the sharp decline in Iran’s TFR (Aghajanian and Mehryar,1991a). 
However, Figure 17 shows that even in the absence of family planning policy, during the years 
1979 to 1989, roughly 50 percent of Iranian couples were using some form of contraception, 
implying that the law cannot undo knowledge. 
The main contribution of the 1989 family planning restoration on the TFR was to narrow the 
rural-urban CPR gap. Figure 18 indicates that in 1977, when there had been an active family 
planning program for over a decade in Iran, 37 percent of married Iranian women aged 15 years 
and older used a contraceptive, 53.8 percent in urban areas and 19.9 percent in rural areas. In 1989, 
when there had been no official program for over a decade, contraceptive prevalence was 64 
percent in urban areas and 31 percent in rural areas. One decade after reviving the family planning 
program, in 2000, contraceptive prevalence increased 13 percent in urban areas and 36.2 percent 
in rural areas.  
Table 6 indicates that the jump in the total CPR in the early 1990s had been mainly in the 
form of modern methods of contraception. However, despite the convenience of modern methods 
provided by the government after 1980, a considerable portion of couples still use traditional 
methods including withdrawal and the rhythm method to avoid pregnancy (Erfani, 2012). Among 
158 countries investigated by the United Nation, Iran with 21.77 percent of prevalence of 
traditional contraception is the 15th country in the world. Erfani (2012) found that among birth 
limiters, those with higher levels of education and/or economic status are more likely to use 
withdrawal rather than modern contraceptives. Moreover, women’s age and education was 
positively associated with the likelihood of using withdrawal rather than modern methods. 
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Although the important role the government played to increase the CPR in rural areas cannot 
be overlooked, regarding the facts that the CPR in Iran has always increased including the years 
that the government followed a pro-natal family planning policy and prevalence of traditional 
methods of contraception, this hypothesis shows that especially in urban areas contraception is just 
an endogenous choice and not a causal effect.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper briefly has explained what TFR determinants are in a country and how a change in 
those determinants effects the country’s birth rate. The TFR determinants has been broken down 
into three broad categories: determinants effecting demand for children, determinants effecting 
supply of children, and the regulation cost. After a short review on the major events, including the 
recession, war, and the political revolutions, which have occurred over the last couple of decades 
in Iran, this paper unravels the possible causes of the country’s sharp TFR decline. What 
distinguishes this paper from existing papers on this topic is that they glossed over the causes of 
decline in fertility with a demographic viewpoint and focused more on factors affecting the supply 
of children: factors like age at the first marriage, and the marriage and divorce rate.  In this paper 
there is an additional consideration mainly focused on the economic variables which affect demand 
for children.  
On demand side, I found that the GDP growth rate and its distribution could have influenced 
the TFR fluctuations, e.g. the effect of real per capita GDP on women’s fertility rate could be 
explained by the Easterlin Relative Income Theory. Moreover, a high inflation rate and a rapidly 
increasing housing price index are in line with the lower number of births in the country. However, 
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the inflation rate and the housing price index could also affect number of births indirectly through 
the marriage postponement. Another cost of having a child is the opportunity cost that women pay 
to bear and rear a child. Since child rearing is mainly a female-intensive, a more educated woman 
will pay more to have a child than a less educated woman. Iran’s data indicates an increasing 
women’s educational level over the years that the country has been experiencing a lower fertility 
rate. However, since Iran has one of the lowest women’s labor force participation rate in the world, 
higher opportunity cost of having a child in form of the time that women scarify could not provide 
a strong explanation for a lower country’s TFR. Another possible factor which could explain the 
TFR trend in Iran is the declining child mortality rate over the last several decades. The Oaxaca 
decomposition technique shows that despite of the noticeable rural to urban migration, only very 
small part of change in the country’s TFR is due to urbanization and it is mainly because of change 
in region-specific birth rate, but they could also have been caused by the same factors that caused 
the decrease in fertility. 
On supply side, national data shows that over the last couple of decades Iran has been 
experienced a higher age at the first marriage, a lower marriage rate, higher divorce rate, a 
relatively high infertility rate. Direction of each of these changes in a country like Iran, in which 
having a child out of wed-lock is illegal, could be a likely explanation of a lower total birth rate. 
Finally, any imbalances between demand and supply in the child market could be adjusted 
either by contraception costs or infertility treatment costs. By the end of 1980’s, as a result of an 
anti-natal family planning policy, the government provided the nation with free contraceptive 
means even in far reaching rural areas at the same time that the TFR was decreasing. Thus, this 
coincidence led many observers to the conclusion that this widespread decline in fertility is 
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inherently connected to the government family planning policy. Undoubtedly, the government 
policy decreased cost, either money or time, of contraception and made a proper environment to 
decrease the fertility by increasing households’ knowledge of the means of regulating fertility, but 
as this paper has shown there are many other factors which all together pushed the fertility down.  
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Figure 3: Age Dependency Ratio, Iran 
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Figure 8: Iran’s Housing Rent Index 
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Table1: Distribution of annual consumption 
expenditures of Urban households by expenditure type, 
Iran 
Expenditure types| year 




2    2012 
Total 100  100  100  
Food, beverages, 
cigarette 34.4  27  
26.
6  
Cloths and foot wear 9.6  6.2  4.5  
Housing and rent 




appliances 6.8  6  4.5  
Health 3.9  5.1  5.5  
Transportation 7.8  14.1  9.4  
Communication 0.6  1.2  2  
Entertainment and 
culture 1.5  3.6  2.3  
Educational service 0.8  1.6  2  
Various goods and 
services11 
6.4  7.9  
10.
3  






      Figure 9: Change in value added of education 
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Table 2: Some indicators of the Welfare of men and women in Iran 
 
1976 1992 2002 2012 
  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Youth literacy rate, (% of population ages 15-
24) 
42.3 70.9 81.212 92.4 90.6 95.5 97.7 98.3 
Adult literacy rate, (% of population ages 15 
and above) 
24.4 48.2 56.2 74.3 70.4 83.5 79.2 89.3 
School enrollment, Primary (% gross13)  76.6 119.1 105.1 114.5 98.2 102.9 105.2 106.6 
School enrollment, Secondary (% gross) 33.9 57.5 49.7 65.7 75.7 80.2 83.4 89 
School enrollment, Tertiary (% gross) 2.6 6.2   19.1 19.1 55.2 55.1 
Labor force participation rate for ages 15-24 
  
12 58.5 14.5 53.1 13.1 48.6 
Labor force participation rate for ages 15 and 
above     
10 79.3 15.9 73.7 16.4 73.1 
Data Source: The World Bank 
         
                                                          
12 Literacy rates are the statistics for 1991. 
13 This  is a Gross enrollment ratio: the total enrollment in primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official population of primary education age. GER can exceed 100% due 
























1972-1982 0.76 -0.16 0.92 
1982-1992 -2.63 -0.14 -2.49 
1992-2002 -2.14 -0.09 -2.05 
1986-2006 -3.81 -0.14 -3.67 
Data Source: Abbasi et.al (2006) for region’s birth rate; the 
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Table 4: Average age at first marriage in Iran 
Year 
Rural  Urban Country 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
1956……………………… 19.3 24.3 18.5 25.7 19 24.9 
1966……………………… 17.9 24.4 19.0 25.6 18.4 25.0 
1976……………………… 19.1 22.7 20.2 25.1 19.7 24.1 
1986……………………… 19.6 22.8 20.2 24.4 19.9 23.8 
1991……………………… 20.8  23.5 21.1 24.9 20.9 24.4 
1996……………………… 22.3 24.6 22.5 26.2 22.4 25.6 
2006……………………… 23.4 25.5 23.3 26.5 23.3 26.2 
2011……………………… 23.0 25.8 23.6 27.1 23.4 26.7 
       






























































































1966 1986 1996 2006 2011



















































































1966 1986 1996 2006 2011





        






Age-standardized prevalence of primary 
infertility 
















1990    8,488,443  2.6% 1.4% 4.3% 6.7% 3.7% 11.4% 
2010  17,100,000  2.5% 1.3% 4.1% 7.2% 3.9% 12.4% 
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Figure17: Trends of the TFR and Contraceptive Use by Married 
Iranian Women 
 

















































































































Total Fertility Rate Contraceptive Prevalance Rate




































































Table 6:  Proportion of married women aged 15-49 using different methods of contraception 
Year 1989 1992 1994 1996 2000 2010 
Region Urban Rural urban Rural Urban Rural urban Rural urban Rural urban Rural 
Pill 19.0 17.0 20.1 26.1 19.2 25.9 19.0 25.8 16.5 21.9 12.8 20.4 
Condom 8.0 3.0 8.0 4.2 8.1 4.7 6.6 4.3 7.2 3.6 15.8 9.0 
IUD 6.0 1.0 10.0 3.1 10.7 3.9 11.0 4.7 10.2 5.3 8.3 7.7 
Tubectomy - - 7.7 7.4 11.4 10.6 14.4 15.7 16.1 18.9 13.4 15.9 
Vasectomy - - 1.3 0.3 1.7 0.5 2.2 0.8 3.5 1.3 3.5 1.3 
Injection - - - - 0.4 0.6 1.2 4.2 1.3 5.5 2.2 6.5 
Norplant - - - - - - - - 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.1 
All Modern 33.0 21.0 47.1 41.1 51.5 46.2 54.4 55.5 55.2 57.2 55.9 60.9 
Traditional 27.0 8.0 27.0 10.4 25.2 10.2 24.2 9.6 21.7 9.7 24.4 13.4 
Other 4.0 2.0 - - 1.1 2.9 2.1 5.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 
Total 64.0 31.0 74.1 51.5 77.9 59.3 80.7 70.1 77.4 67.2 80.8 74.6 





Chapter2 : The effect of the government’s family planning policies on women’s fertility 
rate in Iran 
Abstract 
In the mid-1980s the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran began to plummet, and in less than 20 
years the country experienced a striking 69 percent decrease in fertility. Since this decrease in the 
TFR coincided with the restoration of the national anti-natal family planning policy, some existing 
studies credit this policy for the decline in the TFR. However, the TFR may also have been affected 
by other notable changes in women’s socioeconomic characteristics, including their age, 
education, personal income, and family income. In this paper, I use repeated cross-sectional 
microdata from Iran’s Households Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) over the years 1984- 
2014 to estimate the impact of the government’s family planning policies on fertility among 
women aged 17-35, focusing mainly on a general anti-natal policy instituted in 1989 and a reform 
of the welfare system in 1993. Results indicate that together these policies decreased annual birth 
rates by 15 percent, with even larger effects in rural areas. Since Iranian law forbids births out of 
wedlock, I also investigate the policies’ effects on the marriage rate and the marital fertility rate. I 
find that the policies mainly operated through the former channel – especially in rural areas, where 
the government’s family planning policies account for only 3 percent of the decrease in the marital 
fertility rate. While the 1989 family planning policy drove the decrease in the marital fertility rate 
in urban areas, increases in education played a larger role in rural areas. 
 
Keywords: Family planning policies, marriage, birth rate, women’s education, repeated cross-




Iran experienced a sharp decline, 69 percent, in Total Fertility Rate (TFR) from 1982 to 2002. 
Generally, such a decline only occurs over a span of 40 years in most other developing countries 
(Figure 1). What distinguishes Iran’s declining fertility rate from these other countries is not only 
how quickly the rate fell, but also the fact that the TFR started to decrease when the Islamic pro-
natal government came to power. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the government abolished 
the current anti-natal family planning programs and instead encouraged its citizens to marry early 
and have many children. In the decade that followed, Iran experienced a high population growth 
rate, which in 1989 led to the government returning to a national anti-natal family planning policy. 
The 1989 measures affected all families by encouraging them to have at most two children, 
mandating birth control counseling for all couples before marriage, and providing free 
contraceptive devices at public health centers. In 1993, the government further decreed that for 
every fourth child or more born after 1993 those families would not receive any additional food 
coupons, paid maternity leave, or any other kind of social welfare subsidy. The government 
implemented the child support limits policy until 2010, when the continued decline in TFR put the 
nation at risk of having an aging population in the near future. Thus, the government was forced 
to revert, once again, to a pro-natal family planning policy in 2013.   
Some scholars have argued the sharp decline in Iran’s TFR since 1989 was mostly due to the 
government’s anti-natal family planning policies (Aghajanian, 1995; Hoodfar and Assadpour, 
2000; Mirzaie, 2005). In addition to examining the government’s family planning policies, others 
scholars have also correlated the decline in TFR with women’s socioeconomic conditions such as 
their literacy rates, levels of education, contraceptive prevalence rates, average marriage age, and 
residency in rural/urban areas (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2009; Saadat et al., 2010). In 2010, Salehi-
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Isafahani was the first to evaluate the impact of the government’s family planning policies for 
decreasing the rural fertility rate in Iran. After 2010, other studies began to analyze the impact of 
birth spacing and women’s age of exposure in rural areas on TFR (Modrek and Ghobadi, 2011; 
Hashemi and Salehi-Isafahani, 2013). However, throughout all of the existing literature, little 
attention has been paid to TFR in urban areas. In 1982, 51 % of the country’s population lived in 
urban areas, by 2013 that number increased to 73%.  Because of variation in their socioeconomic 
structures, women in urban areas have a consistently lower TFR than women in rural areas (United 
Nations, 2001). Therefore, we cannot overlook the role that urban areas may have played in 
decreasing the country’s TFR. Moreover, previous studies have treated the 1989 national anti-natal 
family planning policy and the1993 child support limits policy as one and the same without 
considering their premeablity in different types of families. Educated women living in urban areas 
were supposed to be more responsive to the national anti-natal family planning policy, while 
illiterate women especially who lived in rural areas were more subject to the child support limits 
policy. 
In this paper, I use repeated cross-sectional household data from the years 1984 to 2014 to 
measure the impact of the national anti-natal family planning policy and child support limits policy 
distinctly on declining total fertility rates in both rural and urban areas. Additionally, I investigate 
the separate but interconnected roles that women’s literacy rates, levels of education, personal 
income, family income, number of previous children, and changes in the country’s inflation rate 
have had on birth rates. Since having your own child in Iran takes place only within marriage, I 
distinguish the effects of the government’s family planning policies and other major factors on the 
total fertility rate and their effects on the marital fertility rate by investigating a marriage model. 
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 My findings indicate that the national anti-natal family planning policy was more effective in 
decreasing the country’s birth rate than the child support limits policy, with a larger effect in urban 
areas. Unlike the homogenous effect of the national anti-natal family planning policy on areas’ 
birth rates, child support limits policy affected rural areas different from the urban areas. It had a 
negative impact on the rural fertility rate, versus a positive but statistically insignificant one on the 
urban fertility rate. Moreover, these two anti-natal policies had heterogeneous effects on literate 
and illiterate women. While the national anti-natal family planning policy decreased literate 
women’s fertility rate, child support limits policy decreased illiterate women’s probability of 
giving birth. Indeed, these two policies were complementary.  
The results show that the government’s anti-natal policies were a more important factor in 
decreasing the fertility rate in rural areas than changes in women’s literacy rates and their 
education. In contrast, changes in women’s literacy rates and education decreased the urban 
fertility rate one and a half times more than the policy did. Among non-policy determinants of 
women’s fertility, women’s personal income has had a negligible effect, suggesting a smaller 
income effect than the substitution effect. Changes in country’s inflation also have not influenced 
the birth rate a lot, possibly because Iranians have grown to expect high inflation in any event.1 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the historical background of 
the TFR and family planning policies in Iran as well as previous empirical studies in this regard. 
                                                          
1 Considering the method of sampling in the data set I used, I couldn’t check how changes in urbanization may have participated 
in lowering the fertility rate in Iran. However, using the World Bank urbanization data and regional fertility rate from Abbasi 
Shavazi et al. (2009), the Oaxaca decomposition indicates that despite a 14 percent increase in urbanization from 1982 to 2002, the 
change in women’s probability of giving birth due to change in urbanization is 4 percent, and 96 percent is due to changes in region-
specific birth rates. 
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Section 3 describes the data and the methodology used in this study. The fourth section explains 
the empirical results derived. In section 5, I estimate how well the model describes Iran’s falling 
TFR and separate the total fertility rate from the marital fertility rate by estimating a marriage 
model. The last section is the conclusion. 
 
2. Background 
As Figure 1 shows the TFR in Iran was relatively high at 6.7 births per woman (bpw) in 1966. 
This rate was similar to those of most other developing countries of the time.2 Apart from those 
located in Sub-Saharan Africa, all developing countries have experienced a considerable decrease 
in the TFR over the last five decades. By the Twenty-First Century some of them had approached 
the replacement level fertility of 2.1 bpw. What makes Iran different from other developing 
countries, especially Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, is the speed of the 
decline. In twenty years, Iran’s TFR plummeted from 6.5 bpw in 1982 to 1.9 in 2002, whereas 
elsewhere the decline unfolded over forty years.  
Since the precipitous decline in Iran’s TFR coincided with the reintroduction of the anti-natal 
family planning policy in 1989, some existing literature credits the TFR decline to this policy 
(Aghajanian, 1995; Hoodfar and Assadpour, 2000; Mirzaie, 2005, Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald, 
2006). In this regard, the similar pattern of the TFR across provinces in Iran (see Figure 2) supports 
the idea that cause of the rapid decrease in the TFR is something that has affected the entire nation 
at once; a prime candidate could be the national government’s anti-natal family planning policies. 
                                                          
2 The TFR in all developing countries, except those located in Europe and Central Asia, was roughly 6 bpw in 1966. In developing 
countries in Europe and Central Asia it was about 3.3. 
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However, as Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2009) stated, the fast drop of Iran’s TFR had started in 1984, 
five years before the policy restoration. Moreover, as we will see in section 2.1, the TFR has 
decreased steadily for nearly a half-century, even as the direction of the country’s fertility approach 
has changed several times.  Thus, in addition to the government’s family planning policies, other 
factors including changes in women’s socioeconomic conditions such as their literacy rates, levels 
of education, personal income, average marriage age, and residency in rural/urban areas likely 
played considerable roles in the country’s fertility drop. 
 
2.1 Overview of the family planning policies in Iran 
From 1967 to 1979, a national anti-natal family planning policy had been in place in Iran. By 
the end of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, religious leaders argued that the previous secular 
regime’s anti-natal family planning policy was a tool of western nations to weaken Muslim 
countries. Therefore, the new Muslim government ceased the current anti-natal program and 
instead adopted a pro-natal approach by encouraging early marriages and bigger families. 
However, this pro-natal policy was a form of moral suasion without allocating any official funds. 
Since giving birth out-of-wedlock is legally and religiously forbidden in Iran, the new government 
decreased legal marriage age from 20 to 15 for men and 18 from to 13 for women to increase the 
birth rate. 
 The year after the Islamic Revolution, Iran was involved in a long war with Iraq for eight 
years. During the war years, the country experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 
-1.6 percent; basic commodities were rationed and infants were entitled to an adult-sized portion 
of subsidized goods (Saadat et al., 2010). This rationing system may well become an unsustainable 
economic incentive to push families to have more children. When the war ended, Iran with 3.6 
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percent annual population growth rate was the fourteenth highest country in the world. Therefore, 
the government reinstated a national anti-natal family planning policy in 1989. The national anti-
natal family planning policy that was an informative policy to promote contraception, encouraged 
families to have at most two children, to retain birth spacing, and to avoid women from having 
pregnancies before 18 and after 35. Therefore, pre-marriage family planning counseling classes 
became mandatory for couples and the government provided all families with free modern 
contraceptives through the public health centers. Even in remote areas, these services were carried 
out through the mobile clinics (Vakilian & Mirzaii, 2011). The national anti-natal family planning 
policy was supported by the clergy at the national and the local levels. In a complementary action, 
in 1993 the parliament passed further legislation withdrawing food coupons, paid maternity leave, 
and social welfare subsidies after the birth of the third child for every family. The 1993 child 
support limits policy on which a particular group of families were affected was dismantled at 2010. 
Currently, the reduction of the birth rate that was once crucial to checking rapid population 
growth, turned out to be an economic and political crisis in Iran. A sharp decline in the TFR 
threatens the country with serious problems including an aging population, lower working age 
population, saving rates and production rates. Thus, in order to prevent socioeconomic 
consequences of the aging population, in 2006 Iran’s government started to urge couples to have 
more children. In this regard, the government introduced a baby bonus scheme in 2009 to 
encourage larger families. However, the scheme stopped after one year because of budget 
insufficiency. Eventually, in 2013 the national anti-natal family planning policy was officially 
curbed and a year later an official national pro-natal family planning policy was implemented. 
Although the national anti-natal family planning policy officially stopped at 2013, since 2006 the 
government started to balance the anti-natal policy with some pro-natal approaches. Thus, I 
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considered the years 1989-2006 as the years of national anti-natal family planning policy. Also, I 
considered 2013-14 as the years that national pro-natal family planning policy was implemented. 
Because over the years of 1980-1988 there was not a cross-sectional variation in the policy, and 
because a major war happened at the same time, therefore it is not easy to separate the war effect 
from the policy effect. For a timeline of major events and policies possibly affecting fertility in 
Iran, see Figure 3.  
 
2.2 Previous Empirical Studies 
The effects of family planning program in Iran and other developing countries have been 
investigated in many studies. In a multivariate analysis of developing countries, Bongaarts (1997) 
found that program efforts do not have a significant effect on wanted fertility, but the level of 
development significantly decreases it. Miller and Babiarz (2014) review existing empirical 
studies on the micro-level consequences of family planning programs on fertility and other socio-
economic outcomes in developing countries. While some of the studies they review conclude that 
family planning programs do not have statistically significant effects, others find that family 
planning programs reduce fertility by 4-20 percent, increase birth intervals by 5-7 percent, raise 
women’s educational attainment by up to 30 percent, and raise children’s educational attainment 
by 5-18 percent. 
Only a handful of studies have investigated Iran’s fertility policies in particular. The most 
comprehensive study is by Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2009), although its main goal is to report the 
trends and policies, rather than to evaluate explanations. They illustrate that how fast the fertility 
rate has decreased in all areas of Iran and among women of all ages. They also find the 
government’s anti-natal family planning policies successful in falling the country’s birth rate. 
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However, they describe some contributors including, rise in women’s literacy, higher age of 
marriage, rural development, and health improvement which made the Iranian family planning 
program to be so successful in such a short time.  
Other studies have focused specifically on the role of one particular feature of Iran’s family 
planning program: rural health houses, health centers in rural areas that after 1989 offered free 
contraception services to villagers. Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2010) combine data from Iran’s Ministry 
of Health with population census records of 1986 and 1996 to show that health houses contributed 
to 4 to 20% of the decline in the fertility rate depending on the villages’ under-five-year children. 
They used child-to-woman ratio in each village as a fertility measure. Modrek and Ghobadi (2011) 
infer the effects of health houses indirectly, by examining the difference in fertility between 
women who were exposed to family planning at ages when they are more fertile and those who 
were exposed at more advanced ages.  Using data from 2001 HIES, the 2006 Iranian Census, and 
the location and dates of operation for each rural health house, they find that lifetime fertility was 
18 percent lower among women who were first exposed to family planning services between the 
ages of 20-34 than it was among women who were first exposed after age 40. Using a similar 
approach, Hashemi and Salehi-Isfahani (2013) report that the presence of a program was 
associated with a 5-7% increase in birth spacing (Miller & Babiarz, 2014). 
Although each of these papers focused on the programs’ effects in rural areas, there has also 
been a corresponding decline in fertility in urban areas. One contribution of the present study is 
thus to estimate the effects of family planning policy in both rural and urban areas. Moreover, I 
consider potential differences in the effectiveness of the government policy across different 
provinces. I also consider the effect of both national anti-natal family planning policy and child 
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support limits policy on women’s birth rate separately while other studies looked at them as one 
and the same.  
 
3. Data and Model of Childbirth Description 
 3.1 Data description 
The data used in this paper come from the 1984-2014 Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (HIES), an ongoing annual survey that has been conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran 
for more than 30 years. HIES provides a comprehensive range of statistics related to each 
household’s finances, as well as demographic information on each household member’s sex, age, 
marital status, education level, labor force status, etc. In the 30 years of data that I use, 495,268 
households were interviewed, 49 percent of which are located in urban areas compared to 51 
percent in rural areas.3  
Despite the extensive data that HIES provides, HIES is a repeated cross-sectional survey, 
whereby independent samples of households are randomly observed over time. Thus, to estimate 
the parameters which characterize the dynamics of each woman’s fertility, I have constructed a 
pseudo-panel for each interviewed woman. A birth history for each individual woman can be 
derived from the ages of the children living in her household, assuming all children are alive and 
living with the family at the time of the survey. I only consider women aged 17-35 because children 
in Iran often leave their families around the age of 18, either for marriage, education, or military 
service. Restricting the data to women aged 17 to 35 does not account for those living children 
                                                          
3 
The survey uses stratified sampling and divides the sample by province and urban–rural location to ensure representative estimates 
at those levels. 
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who were born when their mother was under 17 and who left the household by the time of the 
survey. A mother’s deceased children are also not included, but this should not cause significant 
measurement error because the child mortality rate is not too high in Iran.4 In those households in 
which more than two generations live together, I do not match daughters-in-law with their children 
to avoid creating a new measurement error. However, over the last 30 years only 6.5 percent of 
married women lived with their in-laws. 
Unlike the women’s birth history, it is not simple to estimate previous values of some control 
variables that affect a woman’s fertility rate (e.g., their personal income and education levels or 
their husband’s income) for the years before the survey date. In most cases, there is little choice 
but to assume that a woman’s characteristics have not changed between age 17 and the age at 
which she was surveyed. For example, I have assigned a woman’s educational level in the years 
before the survey to the same level as it is listed on the survey. For the husband’s income variable, 
which is generally the family’s primary source of income, I found the family’s income decile in 
the area in which each family lived at the time of survey and assumed that decile was the same for 
the years before the survey. An alternate interpretation of this procedure is that the household’s 
position in the local income distribution at the time of the survey is a good representation of its 
position in the local permanent income distribution. I also predicted a woman’s pre-survey income 
based on their socioeconomic characteristics including: the labor force statue, type of employment, 
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age, literacy, education, province in which they live, whether they live in a rural area or in an urban 
area, a time trend, and the lag of inflation.5  
The summary statistics for five selected years of women in the sample are presented in Table 
1. The top lines show that the fertility rate of women aged 17-35 has been declining rapidly. In 
just over 29 years the average number of births per woman decreased from 4 to 0.3 in rural areas 
and from 3 to 0.4 in urban areas. The average age of women who had been married at least once 
has followed a similar pattern of growth in rural and urban areas. Since 1997, the average age of a 
married woman, which had only increased slightly until then, started to increase noticeably. The 
marriage rate has also decreased by roughly 16 percent in both areas. A mother’s average age at 
the time she gave birth to her first child indicates that Iranian women are having children at an 
older age.  
This decrease in fertility may be explained in part by several other economic trends between 
1984 and 2013, especially those involving women’s literacy, levels of education, and labor force 
participation. During this time, the literacy rate among women living in rural areas skyrocketed by 
an astonishing 66.5 percent, while the literacy rate gap between rural and urban areas shrunk by 
37.3 percent. The percentage of women who had at least a high school level of education also has 
increased sharply in both urban and rural areas, respectively from 28.0 to 70.0 percent and from 
3.6 to 36.2 percent. The labor force participation rate for women who live in rural areas had always 
been greater than the rate for women in urban areas, which in part is attributed to the number of 
family businesses in rural areas. Still, participation was growing in both areas until the final year 
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reported in the table, and it seems likely that the reduction in 2013 reflects the sharp downturn in 
the Iranian economy during that year rather than a structural break.  
 
3.2 The Model 
This paper uses a binary choice model to estimate the effect of the government’s family 
planning policies on women’s probability of giving birth. The model is expressed as: 
Pr (𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 = 1|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ ) = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ 𝛽)                                                                                           (1) 
𝑖(𝑡) = 1(𝑡), 2(𝑡), … … , 𝑁(𝑡)  ,                                   𝑠 = 1,2, … . , 𝑇       
Where 𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 is a dependent variable that takes either 1 if  𝑖
𝑡ℎ woman living at time 𝑡 (𝑖(𝑡)) decides 
to have a child at time  𝑠 or  0 otherwise.  F(.) is assumed to have a logistic distribution. This model 
is identical to the latent variable model: 
𝐼𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 = 𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′  𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖(𝑡)𝑠                                                                                                               (2) 
𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 = {
1                   𝑖𝑓     𝐼𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 > 0
0                       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
}                                                                                         (3) 
Where  𝑒~𝐹(. ) and  𝐼𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 is an index function of the propensity to reproduce.  
 𝑋′𝑖(𝑡)𝑠  is a vector of observed explanatory variables that affect a woman’s fertility decision: 
dummy variables representing the government’s family planning policies, a woman’s age, age 
squared, level of education, personal income, personal income’s interaction with time intervals6, 
                                                          
6 
I assume that a woman’s recent income is a more accurate indication of her permanent income than is the previous years’ income. 
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family income, family income’s  interaction with the woman’s age at the time of survey,7 a dummy 
variable for giving birth in the preceding year, number of previous children, number of previous 
sons, a dummy variable for the years that the country was at war, change in inflation, and time 
trend. 
The government family planning policies considered in this model are the 1989-2006 national 
anti-natal family planning policy, the 1993-2010 child support limits policy, the 2009 baby bonus 
scheme, and the 2013-2014 national pro-natal family planning policy. The national anti-natal 
family planning policy and child support limits policy were supposed to decrease the fertility rate 
while the baby bonus scheme and the national pro-natal family planning policy were aimed at 
increasing the fertility rate. However, since the country experienced a recession in 2013 and 2014, 
there is not yet enough information to distinguish the policy’s effect from the recession’s. 
Therefore, I will not interpret the national pro-natal family planning policy’s coefficient. Similarly, 
as the baby bonus scheme was only in place for a year and it was not administratively successful, 
I will not interpret the baby bonus scheme’s coefficient. 
Because of cultural differences between rural and urban areas, I expected that the 
government’s family planning policies have affected a family living in rural areas differently than 
a family living in urban areas. Even within a given area, family planning policies affect women 
differently according to their level of literacy and their age. Therefore, I included all of the 
government’s family planning policy dummy variable interactions with the explanatory variables 
of a rural dummy, a literate dummy, and a woman’s age. However, since the child support limits 
policy mainly affected families with three children or more, I added this policy’s interaction with 
                                                          
7 
Family income for older women is a good proxy for their lifetime income than for youngers. 
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the number of previous children as a new explanatory variable to the model. The probability of 
giving birth changes as a woman ages, as women in their twenties are more likely to give birth. 
Thus, I have categorized women into five age groups: 17-20, 21-24, 25-28, 29-32, and 33-35.  
 Women’s literacy rate and their level of education are two other variables that affect the 
fertility rate by affecting both the opportunity cost of giving a birth and effectiveness of the 
contraception. Thus, women with higher educational levels are supposed to have a lower fertility 
rate. In this study, women are classified into four groups based on their educational achievements: 
women with primary education, guidance school education, high school education, and college 
education. Women with the same educational level but different ages have different fertility 
behavior; older women are more experienced and more likely to be successful in controlling their 
fertility, and younger women are less likely to use contraception effectively (Schmidt, 2008). Also, 
women from different birth cohorts who have the same educational level also have different 
fertility behaviors. A woman’s higher education in previous cohorts indicated a higher 
socioeconomic level of her family. Therefore, I interacted women’s education with both their age 
and birth cohorts. Women are clustered into 4 groups based on the year they were born: those born 
in 1959-68, 1969-78, 1979-88, and 1989-98. 
I introduced a dummy variable that indicates if a woman gave a birth in the preceding year. I 
assume that giving birth in the previous year negatively affects a woman’s probability of giving 
birth in the following year because a mother’s body needs time to heal. The number of children 
(and particularly the number of sons) a woman already has may also negatively affect her demand 
for a new birth. Women from different cohorts who have the same number of children display 
different fertility behavior because of their difference in the desired number of children. In 
addition, families’ attitudes about having a son has changed over time, so I also included 
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interactions of each number of previous children and the number of sons with women’s birth 
cohort.  
War may decrease the TFR because of involuntary spousal separation, postponement of new 
marriages, or because of economic hardships. However, war could increase TFR because of 
limited birth control devices and family planning services and prevailing pro-natal ideologies.  
Although war affects the whole country at once, I expect to see a higher birth rate in provinces 
which are most involved in the war. Because of both higher mortality rates in those provinces and 
those provinces’ cultural desire to have more children (especially more sons). I allowed the war 
effect to differ across provinces. Also, inflation may decrease the fertility rate, either because of 
higher cost of child-rearing or due to decreasing consumers’ confidence. 
Finally, in a pseudo-panel, individual histories are not available for inclusion in the model, 
therefore we can use the cohort sample mean instead of individual observations as an explanatory 
variable (Collado, 1997). I also included area-level fixed effects, 𝛾𝑘 , and province-level fixed 
effects, 𝜇𝑗, to control for all area and province-specific variables including level of socioeconomic 
development, religion, ethnicity and other cultural norms that could confound the estimates.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 2 shows the estimates of the logit coefficients from the model of total fertility arising 
from changes in the women’s socioeconomic characteristics and the government’s family planning 
policies using a region and province fixed effect specification. Most of the coefficients are 
statistically significant. However, since the multitude of interactions makes the raw logit 
coefficients difficult to interpret, the Tables 3-5 report mean marginal effects of the most important 
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explanatory variables. Table 3 displays the marginal effects of the government anti-natal policy 
broken down by different factors. It shows that the national anti-natal family planning policy has 
decreased Iranian women’s probability of giving birth by 11 percent over the years 1984-2013. 
This effect in urban areas is larger: the probability of giving birth for women living in urban areas 
decreased by 14 percent, compared to 9 percent in rural areas.  
The national anti-natal family planning policy also affected literate women differently from 
illiterate women. Although the policy decreased literate women’s total fertility considerably, it had 
a positive effect among illiterate women. The difference in the effects by women’s literacy also 
differs somewhat by the area of residency. In rural areas we see a smaller negative affect of policy 
on literate women and a larger positive affect on illiterate women compare to the urban areas.  A 
more detailed look points out that among literate women, in both rural and urban areas, women 
with more children will respond to the policy more efficiently, which could reflect their experience. 
The national anti-natal family planning policy is more effective in reducing fertility as women’s 
age goes up.  
Giving a birth could be due to an unwanted pregnancy, either for an ineffective use or the 
nonuse of contraceptives. Religious and traditional familial institutions in rural areas may result in 
psychosocial factors associated with contraceptive decision making, including contraceptive 
knowledge, attitudes, and self-efficacy.8 Attitude and self-efficacy are significantly related to 
intended contraceptive use. (See Bogale et al. (2010), Hidarnia et al. (2009), and Sangi-
Haghpeykar et al. (2006).) As a result of implementing national anti-natal family planning policy, 
                                                          




families in both areas had equal access to the contraceptive services. Although economic factors 
and access to the family planning services are important in promoting contraceptive prevalence 
rate, disparities in contraceptive knowledge, attitudes9, and use resulted in different reproductive 
behavior in different areas (Beekle, 2006). Over the years 1989-2010, coincided with the 
implementation of the national anti-natal family planning policy, the contraceptive prevalence 
rate 10  increased from 31 percent to 75 percent in rural areas. Among several contraceptive 
methods, the pill is the most popular contraceptive method in rural areas, but the last Iran 
Demographic and Health Survey (IDHS) reported that only 51.5% of women taking the pill used 
it correctly (Hidarnia et al., 2009). Ehsanpour et al (2011) explain that most unintended 
pregnancies occur when contraceptive methods are discontinued or used non-continuously or 
inappropriately. 
Table 3 also shows that the anti-natal family planning policy has a greater effect on older 
women. Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2013) expressed that younger Iranian women use more temporary 
methods of birth control, like the pill and traditional methods, while among women above age 30 
tubectomy, a secure permanent method of birth control, is the most common. Using permanent 
methods of birth control after age 30 is more common in rural areas than the urban areas. Older 
women are more likely to have a greater number of previous children, which makes preventing 
pregnancy more serious. As they age, couples get more experienced in contraception.   
                                                          
9 Considering of the prevailing female methods of contraception in rural area,  it is more those likely to believe that birth control 
use is the responsibility of women. 
10
 Contraceptive prevalence rate is the percentage of women who are currently using, or whose sexual partner is currently using, 




Marginal effects of the child support limits policy are broken down by several factors display 
in Table 4. It shows that unlike the national anti-natal family planning policy, the child support 
limits policy mostly affected illiterates and women living in rural areas. Since this policy mostly 
affected families who desired to have more than three children, women in rural areas and illiterates 
were more subject to this policy. Moreover, as Kohler (2001) states social interactions affect 
women’s fertility behavior: women’s contraceptive use and effectiveness are determined by their 
friends’ and neighbors’ experience through social learning. Since in rural areas, more women were 
involved in this policy, social interactions were more dominant. The child support limits policy 
not only decreased the birth rate of women who already had 3 children, but also it had a great 
discouraging effect on women with one and two children.  This policy decreased probability of 
giving birth of women with more than three children in urban areas slightly. This could show that 
women who already had more than three children had desired to have more children so that the 
policy couldn’t change their decision.  
Table 5 shows marginal effects of the non-policy variables on women’s fertility decision.  The 
increase in literacy rates decreased women’s propensity to reproduce by 8 and 10 percent in rural 
and urban areas respectively. Changes in education had quite similar effects in both areas. As 
expected, women with a primary education are 28 percent more likely to give birth than women 
who graduated from high school. Among different levels of education, women with college degree 
have the lowest fertility rate. Generally, more-educated women have higher rates of contraceptive 
use and they are more likely to rely on effective methods than their uneducated counterparts 
(Martin, 1995). Education affects the fertility rate by affecting marriage duration and net family 
income, either because more educated women are more likely to be employed and earn higher 
income or because they marry men with higher income (Sathar et al., 1993). Women with no 
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previous children are 69 percent less likely to give birth than women who already have a child. It 
could indicate that women with no children are not willing to have a child yet or that they cannot 
have a birth for a reason of infertility or being single. Propensity to reproduce decreases by around 
45 percent for women who already had more than one child, compared to women who had one 
child.  Having a son decreases women’s probability of giving another birth by 11 percent. Relative 
income of a family compared to the income of other families living in the same area also affects 
women’s decision to procreate. Putting families from the lowest income decile aside, families with 
a greater relative income have a lower fertility rate. A woman in a rural area has 10 percent higher 
fertility rate than a woman living in an urban area. War increased women’s probability of giving 
birth by 2 percent, possibly because of the prevalence of pro-natal ideologies after the revolution 
and rationing system of food and necessary goods.11 Changes in inflation did not affect women’s 
birth decisions. 
 
5. How well does this model explain the trend of fertility? 
5.1 Factors affecting the Total Birth Rate 
Figure 4 indicates that the country’s mean birth rate has decreased from 19.4 births per hundred 
Iranian women aged 17-35 over the years 1984-1988 to 3.6 births in the years 2009-2013. 
Applying a quasi-Oaxaca decomposition, I tried to figure out how related factors may contribute 
in the annual birth rate decline during those three decades. Table 6a represents some back-of-the-
envelope estimates of related factors’ effects on the declining total birth rate. The main factors that 
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could explain women’s total birth rate are changes in women’s education and income, the change 
in their age distribution, the number of their previous children, and the government’s family 
planning policies. However, number of previous children reflects in part indirect effects of the 
other variables, through their effect on prior fertility. 
 The government’s family planning policies played an essential role in creating such a trend. 
The national anti-natal family planning policy and the post-1993 fertility disincentives predict a 
15 percent decrease in the country’s annual birth rate, more than all of the other observable 
categories together. Although the effectiveness of the national anti-natal family planning policy 
on Iranian women’s annual birth rate is roughly three times greater than the effect of child support 
limits policy, these policies together had a similar effect over rural and urban areas. However, the 
former reduced birth rates more in urban areas and the latter was more effective in rural areas. 
Table 6b shows that the literacy rate improvement predicts an additional 8.7 percent reduction 
of the country’s annual birth rate. According to HIES, the literacy rate of women aged 17-35 years 
old has increased by 43.7 percent from 1984-88 to 2009-2013, which predicts that the fertility rate 
would fall by 8.7 percent of 43.7 percent, or 3.8 percent. Similarly, women with higher levels of 
education have a lower probability of giving birth, which is not surprising considering their higher 
opportunity cost of having a child. For example, as compared to women with high school 
education, those with college education are 46 percent less likely to have a birth. On the other 
hand, the fraction of women with higher levels of education has been increasing over time.  Hence, 
the 18.50 percent increase in the fraction of women aged 17-35 with a college education predicts 
an 8.6 percent decrease in annual birth rate. All-in-all, the change in women’s educational 
attainment reduced fertility by 7.3 percent. The largest component is associated with the increase 
in college education, both because there has been a large increase in the share of women who 
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graduate from college and because that level of education is associated with a large decrease in 
fertility. Results suggest that changes in the education distribution had an asymmetric effect on 
birth rates over the areas. The noticeable negative effect on birth rates in urban areas, in contrast 
with a positive effect in rural areas, is mainly because of the lower levels of education in rural 
areas than urban areas. In less developed areas, education has a positive effect on fertility at the 
lower end of educational range (Martin, 1995). The slightly higher fertility among women with a 
few years of schooling is a by- product of the particular system of relationships between education 
and the proximate determinants of fertility at the early stages of the fertility transition (Martin, 
1995).  
Finally, the change in women own real incomes over this era explains virtually none of the 
gap. The negligible effect of women’s income on the annual birth rate comes from the fact that 
their real income has decreased by 3.8 percent over the last three decades. In addition, the low 
Iranian female labor force participation rate (presented in table 1), and its decreasing trend over 
the last three decades, indicates that women’s income in Iran cannot be a strong determinant of the 
fertility decision. This negligible effect also may indicate that the substitution effect resulted by 
the change in women’s real income is compensated by its income effect. 
 The number of children that a woman had previously affects her decision to have a new birth. 
Table 5 shows that the probability of having a child among women with no previous child is much 
less than among women with one previous child. Also, the probability of having a child for women 
who already have 2 children or more is about 40 percent less than among women with one child. 
Considering the 39 percent increase in the share of women with no previous children and 40 
percent decrease of women aged 17-35 who had more than 2 previous children, the annual birth 
rate decreased 16 percent in the country. However, this is quite possibly because many women 
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with zero kids had not married yet. If so, the coefficient is less a causal effect than a proxy for 
marriage. 
Changes in all of the included variables in table 6a predict 41.9% of the 81.5% decline in the 
country’s mean birth rate over the years 1984-88 and 2009-2013.12 This is 51.4 percent of the 
actual change, thus 49.6 percent of the decrease in birth rate is explained by either behavioral 
change (the change in the coefficients) or by factors we have not observed. The model also can 
explain 59% decline of the mean birth in urban areas and 43.8% in rural areas. 
In addition to factors like the government’s family planning policies and women’s education,  
marriage rate plays a key role in Iran’s total birth rate fluctuations. Iran is a country in which births 
must occur within marriage. Thus, having no previous children could be either because of not 
being married yet, because of being infertile, or because the woman is postponing her fertility. 
Thus, the probability of giving birth can be decomposed as, 
𝑝𝑟 (𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 = 1|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ )   = 𝑝𝑟 (𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
𝑀 = 1|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ ) × 𝑝𝑟 (𝑀𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 = 1|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ ) 
                                        +𝑝𝑟 (𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
𝑁𝑀 = 1|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ ) ×  (1 − 𝑝𝑟 (𝑀𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 = 0|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ ))                             (5) 
Where 𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if woman 𝑖 interviewed at time 𝑡 has decided to 
give birth at time 𝑠. 𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
𝑀 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the woman 𝑖 has been married at 
time 𝑠 and decided to give birth. 𝑀𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 is a dummy variable takes 1 if woman 𝑖 is married. 𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
𝑁𝑀 
is a dummy variable which takes 1 if woman 𝑖 is not married and has given birth. 
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′ )is almost zero in Iran, then 
𝑝𝑟 (𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 = 1|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ )   = 𝑝𝑟 (𝐵𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
𝑀 = 1|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ ) × 𝑝𝑟 (𝑀𝑖(𝑡)𝑠 = 1|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑠
′ )                          (6) 
 Hence, with a decomposition technique, I separate change in the TFR into two parts:  the 
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5.2 Factors affecting probability of being married 
Women’s probability of being married changes due to variables including their literacy rates, 
education, age, area of residence, and the government’s family planning policies at ages they 
decide their time of marriage. Since marriage must occur before giving birth in Iran, and the main 
purpose of this paper is to estimate the effect of the government’s policies on women’s fertility 
rate, with a logit model I estimate the probability of marriage. In this estimation, I want to find out 
how the government’s family planning policies may affect the marriage decision of women who 
were 17-19 years old at the time of each policy. Table 7 shows the estimates of the logit coefficients 
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from the model of marriage, and tables 8-10 display the mean marginal effects of the key 
explanatory variables affecting women’s marriage decision. 
Table 8 demonstrates that women who were 17-19 years old when national anti-natal family 
planning policy had been active were 7 percent less likely to marry than women who were older 
at that time. Rural women’s marriage decision was influenced by the national anti-natal family 
planning policy more than urban women’s. Literate women adjusted their marriage decision 
according to this policy much more than illiterate women. Women younger than 20 (especially in 
rural areas) have mainly postponed their marriage as a result of national anti-natal family planning 
policy. Table 9 shows how child support limits policy might affect women’s marriage decision. 
The child support limits policy decreased probability of marriage by about 7 percent in both rural 
and urban areas and at the country level. Unlike the national anti-natal family planning policy in 
which literate women responded more, child support limits policy mainly influenced illiterate 
women’s marriage decision, especially those who lived in rural areas. Like the national anti-natal 
family planning policy, the child support limits policy affects the probability of marriage less as 
women age. Table 10 reports marginal effects of the non-policy variables on women’s marriage 
decisions.  It shows that a literate woman is 12 percent less likely to get married than an illiterate 
woman. This gap is wider in urban areas than rural areas. Among literate women, the joint 
distribution of marriage and education is similar in both rural and urban areas, so women with less 
than high school education are more likely to be married than women with high school education 
and women with college education are less likely than women with high school education. 
Eventually, the probability of marriage goes up as women age; rural women are 16 percent less 
likely to be married than women in urban areas; war has had a positive effect on marriage and 
propensity to marry slightly has decreased as time goes. 
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Figure 5 indicates that the marriage rate for women aged 17-35 has decreased 37 percent 
during the last 30 years. This number is quite similar in both rural and urban areas. As section 5.1, 
I use a quasi-Oaxaca decomposition to figure out how related factors may affect the marriage rate. 
Tables 11a and 11b represent some back-of-the-envelope estimations of related factors’ effect on 
declining the marriage rate. They indicate that 7.5 percent decrease in rural marriage rate is due to 
the government’s family planning policies; while in urban areas, the literacy rate improvement and 
higher education could explain 21.4 percent of decrease of the region’s marriage rate. The model 
could thus explain respectively 11, 75, and 48 percent of actual change in the marriage rate in rural, 
urban, and the whole country. 
Putting the last two sections of 5.1 and 5.2 together, it is obvious that the national anti-natal 
family planning policy has decreased the probability of marriage and the TFR in both rural and 
urban areas. Since the effect of national anti-natal family planning policy on marriage is small, 
thus, the national anti-natal family planning policy affected the TFR through decreasing the marital 
birth rate. Child support limits policy decreased both the marriage rate and the TFR in rural areas. 
Since the effect of policy on marriage is less than on the TFR, so the child support limits policy 
decreased the marital birth rate. However, this effect is opposite in urban areas. A lower marriage 
rate as a result of child support limits policy coincided with a higher TFR. Higher literacy rate 
decreased the TFR mainly through lowering the marriage rate specially in urban areas. Higher 
levels of education had had an opposite effect on probability of marriage in rural and urban areas. 
In rural areas, education has affected the TFR mainly through lowering marital fertility rate, while 





In this paper, I have investigated Iranian women’s demand for giving birth between the years 
1980 to 2013. By controlling for women’s socioeconomic conditions influencing their demand for 
child-bearing, I identified different patterns among rural and urban women. Results show that two 
separate but consistent post-revolution family planning policies in 1989 and 1993 worked as 
complements at the country level. While one mostly influenced the total birth rate of literate 
women in urban areas, the other affected illiterate women’s more, especially those living in rural 
areas. Similarly, women’s educational achievement and higher literacy rate had heterogeneous 
effects: a 19 percent decrease in the total birth rate in urban areas came from women’s higher 
levels of education, while in rural areas education’s share of the total fertility drop is only 3%. This 
paper’s findings indicate that the rural birth rate has fallen by 17 percent as a result of both the 
national anti-natal family planning policy and child support limits policy, which lies within the 
range of estimates found by Salehi-Isfahani (2010). In addition to that, the results imply a 14% 
negative effect of those policies on birth rates in urban areas. 
Giving a birth out-of-marriage is not a case in Iran. Thus, the birth rate enquiry dose not lead to 
reliable results without the marriage rate investigation. Therefore, in order to find out the effect of 
the government’s family planning policies on the TFR, I moved one step back to check the effect 
of the government’s policies and women’s socioeconomic characteristics on their likelihood of 
marriage. Almost all of the investigated variables negatively affected the marriage rate in both 
areas; among all of them the 17% negative effect of women’s education on their marriage rate in 
urban areas and its 9% positive effect on rural areas are noticeable.  
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Finally, I could find the impact of the most effective key variables including the government’s 
family planning policies, and education on women’s demand of a birth. The marital birth rate 
which is the total birth rate adjusted with marriage rate. Among observed variables 1989 national 
anti-natal family planning policy in urban areas and national anti-natal family planning policy and 
education in rural areas were the main reasons of married women’s lower propensity to give birth. 
This fining is consistent with those from Hashemi and Salehi-Isfahani(2013) which have shown a 
stronger negative effect of the education than program effect on rural women fertility rate. 
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Figure 2: TFR13 trends of women aged 17-35 years old at the provincial level on Iran, 1975-2013 
 
                                                          

































































1967:  Initiation of the anti-natal family planning policy. 
Early 1979: Islamic Revolution. Suspension of anti-natal policy and propagation of pro-natalist ideology. 
1981–88:  Iran-Iraq War. 
1989: Anti-natal policy reinstated. Goal: reduce population growth rate to 2.3 percent by 2011 (TFR of 4 bpw). 
1991-92: Budget allocates 3.6 billion Rial (in 2010 prices) over two years to anti-natal family planning policy.  
1993: New law withdraws food coupons, paid maternity leave, and social welfare subsidies after the third child. 
1997: Change in country’s political climate. President Khatami wins the presidential election due to unprecedented support from many youth and women, who hoped to witness 
democratization14. 
2006: Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, defended an increasing population growth rate and called for a baby boom to almost double the country’s population to 120 million. 
2009: Introduction of a baby bonus scheme15  as a means of increasing country’s fertility rate. 
2010: welfare restrictions on forth child and more was repealed. 
2012: Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, warns that the country’s population is aging and suggests that the number of Iranian citizens should be at least doubled (The Guardian, 
2015). 
2013: Budget for population control eliminated. Maternity leave extended from six months to nine, plus new two-week paternity leave. 
2014: Legislation bans permanent forms of birth control. Punishments initiated for those encouraging contraceptive services and abortions. (Washington Post, 2014) 
 
Sources: Moore (2007) for 1966 -1989, Roudi-Fahimi (2002) for 1993, Fairbanks (1998) for 1997 
Figure 3: Time Line for Family Planning in Iran 
                                                          
14 During his electoral campaign, he proclaimed that “women should be active in all social, political and economic activities and efforts should be made to do away with male supremacy” 
15 Under the new scheme, each child born in the current Iranian year, would receive a deposit of 10 million Rial(approximately 1000 $US) in a government bank account. They will then continue to receive another 1 million 






Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables for women aged 17-35 during 1984-2013 
Year 1984 1989 1997 2005 2013 
Variable Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Births per 100 women 21.8 17.8 18.5 14.6 9.0 8.1 6.6 5.9 1.8 2.0 
Fertility rate 4.0 3.0 3.6 2.6 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.3 0.4 
Average age| ever-married 22.6 22.6 22.5 22.9 22.9 22.9 24.4 24.4 27.1 27.6 
Percentage of ever-married women16 78.4 77.0 68.7 70.1 61.1 63.5 52.6 56.1 62.7 61.4 
Average of mothers’ age at first birth 19.7 20.1 19.8 20.1 20.3 20.6 21.2 21.3 23.6 23.8 
Literacy rate 25.0 67.8 36.3 72.5 73.0 91.5 84.0 95.4 91.5 97.0 
Education- high school and above 3.6 28.0 4.3 32.8 13.2 48.7 25.6 60.6 36.2 70.0 
Labor force participation rate 19.5 16.4 22.2 12.1 26.0 15.0 23.2 18.1 15.8 16.9 
Number of observations 8,368 10,843 4,476 4,196 8,924 8,317 12,021 10,608 12,689 12,721 








                                                          






Table 2: Selected logistic regression estimates: predicting probability of the birth by women aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013 
Variable Coef. SE Variable Coef. SE 
      
Anti-natal Policy 0.36*** 0.04 Rural Dummy   0.09*** 0.01 
 × Rural Dummy 0.07*** 0.02    
× Literate Dummy -0.17*** 0.02 Literate Dummy -0.02 0.02 
× Rural Dummy × Literate Dummy  -0.06*** 0.02  × Rural Dummy 0.07*** 0.01 
× Age -0.02*** 0.00    
    Number of previous children Dummy   
Pro-natal Policy -1.14*** 0.31 No child 0.12*** 0.04 
 × Rural Dummy -0.44* 0.24 One Child - - 
× Literate Dummy -0.35* 0.20 Two children -0.38*** 0.05 
× Rural Dummy × Literate Dummy   0.26 0.25 Three children -0.75*** 0.06 
× Age 0.04*** 0.01 More than three children -1.02*** 0.08 
     × Age   
1993 Child support limits -1.80*** 0.05 No child -0.06*** 0.00 
× Rural Dummy -0.09*** 0.02 One Child - - 
× Literate Dummy    0.04* 0.02 Two children 0.00* 0.00 
× Rural dummy × Literate Dummy    -0.01 0.02 Three children 0.01*** 0.00 






Table 2: Selected logistic regression estimates: predicting probability of the birth by women aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013-countinued 
Variable Coef. SE Variable Coef. SE 
No child 1.17*** 0.06    
One Child - - Cohort Dummy   
Two children 0.79*** 0.07 Women born in 1959-68 0.78** 0.31 
Three children 1.79*** 0.09 Women born in 1969-78 0.37 0.31 
More than three children 2.52*** 0.12 Women born in 1979-88 0.40 0.31 
× Age 0.06*** 0.00 Women born in 1989-98 -0.06 0.37 
×  Number of previous children Dummy×Age   × Age   
No child -0.02*** 0.00 Women born in 1959-68 -0.03*** 0.01 
One Child - - Women born in 1969-78 -0.01 0.01 
Two children -0.04*** 0.00 Women born in 1979-88 -0.01 0.01 
Three children -0.07*** 0.00 Women born in 1989-98 0.03* 0.02 
More than three children -0.10*** 0.00    
   Number of previous children 0.06*** 0.01 
2009 Baby bonus scheme   0.13 0.13 × Cohort Dummy   
 × Rural Dummy  -0.05 0.10 Women born in 1959-68 -0.01 0.01 
× Literate Dummy  -0.17* 0.09 Women born in 1969-78 -0.04*** 0.01 
× Rural Dummy × Literate Dummy    0.10 0.10 Women born in 1979-88 -0.07*** 0.01 
× Age   0.00 0.00 Women born in 1989-98 -0.47*** 0.03 






Table 2: Selected logistic regression estimates: predicting probability of the birth by women aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013-countinued 
Variable Coef. SE Variable Coef. SE 
× Time interval 0.00*** 0.00 × Cohort Dummy   
   Women born in 1959-68 -0.04*** 0.01 
Family Income Decile Dummies   Women born in 1969-78 -0.10*** 0.01 
0 -6.87*** 0.05 Women born in 1979-88 -0.18*** 0.01 
1 0.20*** 0.05 Women born in 1989-98 -0.25*** 0.05 
2 0.19*** 0.05    
3 0.19*** 0.05    
4  -0.01 0.05 Education    
5 - - Primary 1.04*** 0.34 
6 -0.14*** 0.05 Guidance School 0.85** 0.42 
7 -0.30*** 0.05 High School - - 
8 -0.49*** 0.05 College 0.77 0.64 
9 -0.71*** 0.05 × Age    
× Time interval   Primary -0.03*** 0.01 
0 0.19*** 0.00 Guidance School -0.04** 0.01 
1 0.00 0.00 High School - - 
2 0.00 0.00 College -0.03 0.02 
3 0.00 0.00    
4 0.00 0.00 Age Dummies   






Table 2: Selected logistic regression estimates: predicting probability of the birth by women aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013-countinued 
Variable Coef. SE Variable Coef. SE 
6 0.00** 0.00 21-24 0.10*** 0.01 
7 0.01*** 0.00 25-28 - - 
8 0.01*** 0.00 29-32 0.24*** 0.01 
9 0.02*** 0.00 33-35 0.24*** 0.03 
      
Change in inflation 0.00*** 0.00 Age 0.86*** 0.01 
War -0.08*** 0.02 Age2 -0.02*** 0.00 
Year -0.05*** 0.00 Number of birth in the preceding year 3.03***  0.20 
   × Age -0.35*** 0.02 
   × Age2 0.01*** 0.00 
      
Constant 80.01*** 1.61    
      
Pseudo R2  =     0.1745      
       n           =     5,031,580      
Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES, 1984-2013 
Note: Other non-reported controls include dummy variables province of residence and their interactions with war, interaction of woman’s birth cohort 
with her education, interaction of woman’s birth cohort with her education and her age . * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 







Table 3: Marginal effect of the NANFPP on the annual births of women aged 17-35,1984-2013 
Variable 










NANFPP -0.09*** 0.01 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0. 01 
   By literacy       
Literate -0.14*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.01 
Illiterate 0.06*** 0.00 0.01 0.02    0.03** 0.01 
By number of previous children        
No child -0.09*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.01 
One Child -0.09*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.01 
Two children -0.11*** 0.01 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.14*** 0.01 
Three children -0.09*** 0.01 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 
More than three children -0.08*** 0.01 -0.16*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.01 
By literacy and Number of previous children        
Literate-No child -0.12*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 
Literate-One Child -0.12*** 0.01 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 
Literate-Two children -0.16*** 0.01 -0.18*** 0.01 -0.17*** 0.01 
Literate-Three children -0.18*** 0.01 -0.20*** 0.01 -0.19*** 0.01 
Literate-More than three children -0.20*** 0.01 -0.22*** 0.01 -0.21*** 0.01 






Table 3: Marginal effect of the NANFPP on the annual births of women aged 17-35,1984-2013-countinued 
Variable 










Illiterate -One Child 0.06*** 0.01    -0.01 0.02    0.02* 0.01 
Illiterate -Two children 0.03*** 0.01    -0.04** 0.02    0.00 0.01 
Illiterate -Three children 0.02 0.01   -0.05*** 0.02   -0.02 0.01 
Illiterate -More than three children -0.01 0.01 -0.07*** 0.02   -0.03*** 0.01 
By literacy and age       
Literate-17-20 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.09*** 0.01 -0.08*** 0.01 
Literate-21-24 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 
Literate-25-28 -0.18*** 0.01 -0.19*** 0.01 -0.19*** 0.01 
Literate-29-32 -0.24*** 0.01 -0.26*** 0.01 -0.25*** 0.01 
Literate-33-35 -0.31*** 0.01 -0.32*** 0.01 -0.31*** 0.01 
Illiterate -17-20 0.13*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.02 
Illiterate -21-24 0.07*** 0.01   0.01 0.02 0.04*** 0.01 
Illiterate -25-28  0.02 0.01  -0.04** 0.02  -0.01 0.01 
Illiterate -29-32 -0.03** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.01 
Illiterate -33-35 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.16*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.02 
Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES, 1984-2014   







Table 4: Marginal effect of the  CSLP on the annual births of women aged 17-35,1984-2013 
Variable 













       
CSLP -0.08*** 0.01    0.01 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
By literacy       
Literate -0.06*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.01   -0.02** 0.01 
Illiterate -0.15*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.02 -0.14*** 0.01 
By number of previous children        
No child 0.08*** 0.01 0.18*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01 
One Child -0.27*** 0.01 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.22*** 0.01 
Two children -0.30*** 0.01 -0.20*** 0.01 -0.25*** 0.01 
Three children -0.28*** 0.01 -0.20*** 0.02 -0.24*** 0.01 
More than three children -0.35*** 0.01 -0.27*** 0.02 -0.32*** 0.01 
By literacy and number of previous children        
Literate-No child 0.09*** 0.01 0.18*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01 
Literate-One Child -0.27*** 0.01 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.22*** 0.01 
Literate-Two children -0.30*** 0.01 -0.20*** 0.01 -0.25*** 0.01 






Table 4: Marginal effect of the  CSLP on the annual births of women aged 17-35,1984-2013-Countinued 
Variable 













Literate-More than three children -0.34*** 0.02 -0.27*** 0.02 -0.31*** 0.02 
Illiterate -No child 0.08*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.02 0.12*** 0.01 
Illiterate -One Child -0.27*** 0.01 -0.18*** 0.02 -0.22*** 0.01 
Illiterate -Two children -0.30*** 0.01 -0.22*** 0.02 -0.26*** 0.01 
Illiterate -Three children -0.28*** 0.02 -0.21*** 0.02 -0.25*** 0.02 
Illiterate -More than three children -0.35*** 0.02 -0.28*** 0.02 -0.32*** 0.02 
Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES, 1984-2014  














Table 5: Marginal effect of non- policy variables on the annual births of women aged 17-35,1984-2013 
Variable 













       
Literate Dummy -0.08*** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.02 -0.09*** 0.01 
Education        
Primary 0.28*** 0.00 0.28*** 0.00 0.28*** 0.00 
Guidance School 0.14*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01 
High School - - - - - - 
College -0.47*** 0.01 -0.46*** 0.01 -0.46*** 0.01 
Number of previous children       
No child -0.67*** 0.01 -0.71*** 0.01 -0.69*** 0.01 
One Child - - - - - - 
Two children -0.47*** 0.01 -0.47*** 0.01 -0.47*** 0.01 
Three children -0.37*** 0.01 -0.38*** 0.01 -0.38*** 0.01 
More than three children -0.22*** 0.03 -0.23*** 0.03 -0.23*** 0.03 
Total son -0.11*** 0.00 -0.12*** 0.00 -0.11*** 0.00 
Log of women’s real income -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 






Table 5: Marginal effect of non- policy variables on the annual births of women aged 17-35,1984-2013-Countinued 
Variable 













Family income decile dummies       
0 -1.33*** 0.01 -1.33*** 0.01 -1.33*** 0.01 
1 0.21*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.01 
2 0.16*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.01 
3 0.10*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.01 
4 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
5 - - - - - - 
6 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
7 -0.10*** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.01 
8 -0.15*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.01 
9 -0.24*** 0.01 -0.24*** 0.01 -0.24*** 0.01 
Rural Area - - 0.10*** 0.00 - - 
War years    0.02 0.01    0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Yearly time trend -0.04*** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.00 
Change in inflation 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES, 1984-2014   
























































































Table 6a: Contribution of selected explanatory variables to the gap in actual fertility outcomes of women aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013 
 Estimated effect on Annual Fertility Rate (percentage change) 
Variable   Rural Urban Country 
Actual change observed  -82.6  -80.5  -81.5 
Total change explained by these factors  -36.2  -47.8  -41.9 
NANFPP  -8.8  -13.8  -11.3 
CSLP  -8.5  0.9  -3.8 
Literacy rate  -4.7  -2.8  -3.8 
Education  1.7  -16.3  -7.3 
Primary 4.1  -4.2  -0.1  
Guidance School 2.3  0.6  1.4  
High School 0.0  0.0  0.0  
College -4.6  -12.7  -8.6  
Women’s log Income  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Number of previous children  -15.9  -15.8  -15.7 
No child -25.5  -28.5  -27.0  
One Child 0.0  0.0  0.0  
Two children -1.2  2.1  0.5  
Three children 3.0  4.8  3.9  
More than three children 7.8  5.9  6.8  












Table 6b: Explained changes of women’s fertility through educational attainment  
     Year      Education 1984-1988 Education 2009-2013 Percentage Change in Education             Margins Explained change 
Levels of Education R U N R U N R U N R U N R U N 
Literacy Rate 28.1 67.9 49.4 89.8 96.5 93.1 61.7 28.5 43.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -4.7 -2.8 -3.8 
Primary 22.1 29.4 26.0 36.5 14.6 25.7 14.4 -14.8 -0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 4.1 -4.2 -0.1 
guidance school 1.6 9.7 6.0 18.4 13.9 16.2 16.8 4.2 10.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.3 0.6 1.4 
high school 3.6 24.7 14.9 24.9 36.9 30.8 21.3 12.2 15.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
College 0.2 3.2 1.8 9.9 30.9 20.3 9. 8 27.8 18.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -4.6 -12.7 -8.6 












Table 7: Selected logistic regression estimates: predicting probability of the marriage by women aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013 
Variable Coef. SE Variable Coef. SE 
NANFPP -0.19*** 0.06 CSLP -0.08** 0.04 
 × Rural Dummy 0.22*** 0.02  × Rural Dummy -0.05*** 0.02 
× Literate Dummy 0.12*** 0.03 × Literate Dummy -0.72*** 0.03 
× Rural Dummy × Literate Dummy  -0.26*** 0.07 × Rural Dummy × Literate Dummy  0.07 0.06 
× Age   × Age   
17 -0.09 0.07 17 -0.16*** 0.06 
18 -0.10 0.07 18 -0.10** 0.05 
19 -0.15** 0.07 19 -0.06 0.05 
20 -0.11 0.06 20 0.03 0.05 
21 -0.05 0.07 21 0.10* 0.05 
22 -0.06 0.06 22 0.05 0.05 
23 -0.09 0.07 23 0.08 0.05 
24 -0.12* 0.07 24 0.01 0.05 
25 - - 25 - - 
26 -0.10 0.08 26 0.01 0.06 
27 -0.17** 0.08 27 0.03 0.06 
28 -0.18** 0.08 28 0.01 0.06 






Table 7: Selected logistic regression estimates: predicting probability of the marriage by women aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013-countinued 
Variable Coef. SE Variable Coef. SE 
30 -0.13* 0.08 30 -0.08 0.06 
31 -0.18** 0.09 31 -0.10 0.07 
32 -0.05 0.08 32 -0.14** 0.07 
33 -0.13 0.09 33 -0.10 0.07 
34 -0.03 0.09 34 -0.15* 0.08 
35 -0.26*** 0.08 35 -0.07 0.07 
Rural Dummy 0.35*** 0.03 Education    
   Primary 0.39*** 0.04 
Literate Dummy 0.28*** 0.05 Guidance School 0.64*** 0.04 
 × Rural Dummy -0.02 0.05 High School - - 
   College -1.30*** 0.04 
Year -0.01*** 0.00 War  0.95*** 0.10 
Age   Cohort   
17 -3.29*** 0.08 1959-1968 -0.43*** 0.08 
18 -2.61*** 0.07 1969-1978 -0.70*** 0.08 
19 -2.04*** 0.08 1979-1988 -0.79*** 0.09 
20 -1.53*** 0.08 1989-1998 -0.67*** 0.09 
21 -1.26*** 0.08    
22 -0.86*** 0.07    






Table 7: Selected logistic regression estimates: predicting probability of the marriage by women aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013-countinued 
Variable Coef. SE Variable Coef. SE 
24 -0.18** 0.08    
25 - -    
26 0.27*** 0.08    
27 0.44*** 0.08    
28 0.73*** 0.08    
29 0.82*** 0.09    
30 0.88*** 0.08    
31 1.16*** 0.10    
32 1.12*** 0.09    
33 1.13*** 0.10    
34 1.24*** 0.11    
35 1.35*** 0.10    
      
Constant 15.57*** 3.23    
Pseudo R2  =     0.3129      
       n           =        559,641      
Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES, 1984-2013 
Note: Other non-reported controls include dummy variables province of residence and their interactions with war, interaction of woman’s Age with three 
explanatory variables: area of her residency, education and war. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard Errors are clustered 








Table 8: Marginal effect of the NANFPP on probability of marriage of women aged 17-35,1984-2013 
Variable 













       
NANFPP -0.11*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01 
   By literacy       
Literate -0.13*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.08*** 0.01 
Illiterate -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
By Age        
17 -0.22*** 0.03 -0.06* 0.03 -0.15*** 0.03 
18 -0.21*** 0.03 -0.07** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.03 
19 -0.23*** 0.02 -0.10** 0.03 -0.17*** 0.02 
20 -0.17*** 0.02 -0.06* 0.02 -0.12*** 0.02 
21 -0.13*** 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.08*** 0.02 
22 -0.12*** 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 
23 -0.11*** 0.02 -0.03* 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 
24 -0.11*** 0.01 -0.04** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.01 
25 -0.05*** 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.02 








Table 8: Marginal effect of the NANFPP on probability of marriage of women aged 17-35,1984-2013-Continued 
Variable 
 













27 -0.08*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 
28 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
29 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
30 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
31 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
32 -0.02*** 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01** 0.01 
33 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02*** 0.01 
34 -0.02*** 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
35 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 
Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES, 1984-2014   













Table 9: Marginal effect of the CSLP on probability of marriage of women aged 17-35,1984-2013 
ariable 










CSLP -0.08*** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01 
By literacy       
Literate -0.05*** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 
Illiterate -0.16*** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.00 
By Age        
17 -0.24*** 0.03 -0.26*** 0.04 -0.25*** 0.03 
18 -0.18*** 0.03 -0.19*** 0.03 -0.19*** 0.03 
19 -0.14*** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.03 -0.14*** 0.03 
20 -0.07*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 
21 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
22 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.05*** 0.02 
23 -0.04** 0.02 -0.03** 0.02 -0.03** 0.02 
24 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
25 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
26 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
27 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 








Table 9: Marginal effect of the CSLP on probability of marriage of women aged 17-35,1984-2013-Continued 
Variable 










29 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
30 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
31 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
32 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
33 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
34  -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
35 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.03*** 0.01 
Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES, 1984-2014   
















Table 10: Marginal effect of non- policy variables on probability of marriage of women aged 17-35,1984-2013 
Variable 













       
Literate Dummy -0.09*** 0.02 -0.15*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.02 
Education        
Primary 0.44*** 0.01 0.35*** 0.00 0.40*** 0.00 
Guidance School 0.51*** 0.01 0.41*** 0.00 0.46*** 0.00 
High School - - - - - - 
College -0.60*** 0.02 -0.49*** 0.02 -0.55*** 0.02 
Age       
17 -1.35*** 0.02 -1.65*** 0.05 -1.49*** 0.03 
18 -1.01*** 0.02 -1.25*** 0.02 -1.13*** 0.02 
19 -0.79*** 0.01 -0.95*** 0.02 -0.87*** 0.01 
20 -0.53*** 0.01 -0.64*** 0.01 -0.58*** 0.01 
21 -0.39*** 0.01 -0.45*** 0.01 -0.42*** 0.01 
22 -0.26*** 0.01 -0.27*** 0.01 -0.27*** 0.01 
23 -0.16*** 0.01 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.16*** 0.01 








Table 10: Marginal effect of non- policy variables on probability of marriage of women aged 17-35,1984-2013-Continued 
Variable 













25 - - - - - - 
26 0.06*** 0.01 0.08*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 
27 0.09*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.01 
28 0.14*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.01 
29 0.16*** 0.01 0.18*** 0.01 0.17*** 0.01 
30 0.18*** 0.01 0.20*** 0.01 0.19*** 0.01 
31 0.21*** 0.01 0.24*** 0.01 0.22*** 0.01 
32 0.23*** 0.01 0.24*** 0.01 0.24*** 0.01 
33 0.24*** 0.01 0.25*** 0.01 0.24*** 0.01 
34 0.25*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.01 0.26*** 0.01 
35 0.26*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.01 
Rural Area   0.16*** 0.00 - - 
War years 0.22*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.01 
Yearly time trend -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
       
 Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES, 1984-2014   












































































Table 11a: Contribution of selected explanatory variables to the change in actual marriage rate of women 
aged 17-35 between 1984 and 2013 
Estimated effect on Marriage Rate (percentage change) 
Variable   Rural Urban Country 
Actual change observed -36.0  -37.2  -36.6  
Total change explained by these factors -4.0  -28.0  -17.7  
NANFPP -0.4  -0.3  -0.3  
CSLP -7.1  -6.3  -6.7  
Literacy rate -5.5  -4.3  -5.2  
Education 9.0  -17.1  -5.5  
Primary 6.3  -5.2  0.0  
Guidance School 8.6  1.7  0.0  
High School 0.0  0.0  0.3  
College -5.9  -13.6  -10.1  
       













Table 11b: Explained changes of women’s marriage because of educational attainment  
     Year      1984-1988 2009-2013 Percentage Change in  Margins Explained change 
Levels of 
Education 
Rural Urban Nationwide Rural Urban Nationwide Rural Urban Nationwide Rural Urban Nationwide Rural Urban Nationwide 
NANFPP* 60.6 61.6 61.1 65.5 66.4 66.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
CSLP** 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.0 90.0 89.5 89.0 90.0 89.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -7.1 -6.3 -6.7 
Literacy 
Rate 
28.9 67.9 49.4 89.8 96.5 93.1 61.7 28.5 43.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -5.5 -4.3 -5.2 
Primary 22.06 29.4 25.99 36.46 14.6 25.71 14.4 -14.8 -0.28 0.44 0.35 0.00 6.3 -5.2 0.0 
guidance 
school 
1.63 9.66 5.92 18.4 13.91 16.19 16.77 4.25 10.27 0.51 0.41 0.00 8.6 1.7 0.0 
high 
school 
3.59 24.71 14.89 24.85 36.93 30.79 21.26 12.22 15.9 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.3 
College 0.17 3.18 1.78 9.95 30.95 20.28 9.78 27.77 18.50 -0.60 -0.49 -0.55 -5.9 -13.6 -10.1 
Data Source: Computed from Iran’s HIES,1984-2013, using mean marginal effects from tables 7-10 
* How many percent of women were 17-19 years old when the anti-natal family planning policy was active. ** How many percent of women were 17-










Chapter 3: Second decade, first birth: How access to local 2-year colleges affects Adolescents 
birth rate in the U.S. 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses county variation in the number of 2-year schools and state variation in 
tuition costs over the years 2005-2017 to test whether easier access to local colleges affects teens’ 
birth rate. Data on the outcomes of interest are taken from Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). The difference-in-difference method was used to assess associations between 
availability and affordability of county-level 2-years schools, and teens’ birth rates among counties 
with population greater than 100,000. Results show that younger teens (15-17) respond to opening 
a new 2-year school differently from older teenagers (18-19). While the former group increases its 
birth rate with a marginal elasticity of 0.06, the latter postpones its birth decision with a marginal 
elasticity of -0.03. Despite their contrary response to the number of schools, all teenagers respond 
the same to a change in tuition. Teenagers, either younger or older, increase their birth rate if 
attending a 2-year school is more affordable, with younger teenagers and those living in smaller 
counites being most sensitive to changes in tuition.  
 
1. Introduction 
Among the top twenty countries with the highest Human Development Index, the U.S. has 
had the highest adolescent fertility rate in over the last half-century. Although teens’ birth rate has 
decreased considerably from 39.7 births per 1,000 women in 2005 to 18.8 in 2017, it is still one of 





moving teen fertility, including and especially education (Geruso and Royer, 2018). It could be 
because studies of fertility unanimously proved women’s education as a major factor in decreasing 
fertility rates (Basu, 2002). In addition to the lower fertility rate that comes from the higher 
opportunity costs of bearing children for educated women, education affects fertility rate by 
informing women’s choices and giving them the confidence needed to act on these choices. 
Education also decreases women’s birth rate by enhancing their marital aspirations and making 
them revise the type of man they would like to marry and the quality of life they would like to 
have (Jeffery and Basu 1996, Basu 1999, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, Goldin 1992, Jejeebhoy 
1995). For such reasons, education is often thought to be an especially important determinant of 
the fertility of teen girls, who are in the early stages of human capital development and 
marital relationships.  
In line with the effect of education on teenagers’ fertility, in this paper I examine whether 
greater access to local 2-year colleges influences teens’ birth rates in the United States. I focus on 
2-year colleges because their significantly lower tuition makes postsecondary education more 
affordable. Moreover, 2-year colleges tend to attract students from the local area, especially those 
with lower attachment to the educational system, lower educational aspirations, and higher lifetime 
fertility (Pascarella et. al 1998, Stewart 2003). Another reason of selecting 2-year colleges is that 
although many studies have revealed a negative relationship between women’s higher educational 
level and their fertility, there are some reasons to suspect the effect of a local 2-year college on 
teenagers’ birth rate could be positive. Teenagers attending a 2-year school could be different from 
their peers in a 4-year school in genetic endowments, family background, ability, financial 
capability, and educational and occupational aspiration. As a result of these differences, they are 





higher risk of early childbearing, the locality of 2-year colleges could increase teen’s birth rates if 
they decide to stay in their family home to save more money, and in case of pregnancy, they can 
have their family’s help and financial support. Attending a more local school also means they are 
more likely to maintain existing social contracts, which may raise the likelihood of pregnancy. 
There is a little research on the effect of 2-year schools on women’s fertility. The main 
paper in this topic is by Currie and Moretti (2003). They studied roles that opening a 2-year college 
may play in increasing the health of a woman’s child. They found that attending a 2-year school 
improves the child’s health by decreasing the number of children that a woman decides to have. 
They focused on white women of any ages between the years 1940-1990. What is done differently 
in this paper is the use of more recent data from 2005-2017 with a focus on teenagers aged 15-19 
of different races and ethnicities. To evaluate the effect of opening local 2-year colleges on 
teenagers’ fertility, I use panel data from the 580 most populous U.S. counties and apply a 
difference-in-difference method.  
Results indicate that among teenagers aged 15-17, an increase in the number of local 2-
year colleges availability increases the birth rate, with a marginal elasticity of 0.06. However, 
among teenagers aged 18-19 it decreases the birth rate. Despite the different responses to the 
number of 2-year schools, both younger and older teenagers will demand a child less often if they 
must pay more to attend a 2-year. Teen’s tuition elasticity of birth changes by age, race, and size 
of the county they reside. White teenagers’ demand for a child is more sensitive to change in 2-
year school tuition compared to black teenagers. Teenagers living in small/less populated counties 
are more sensitive to tuition than those living in big counties. Teens aged 15-17 are more sensitive 





This paper has been divided into six sections. Section 2 provides background information 
on teens’ birth rates in the United States and discusses related studies. Section 3 presents several 
hypotheses about how opening a 2-year college may affect teenagers’ birth decision. Section 4 
describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 examines the empirical data, and the final 
section concludes with a brief discussion and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Background Information  
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2015 maternal causes ranked 
second among causes of mortality in 15–19-year-old girls globally (WHO 2015). Besides 
contributing to the health risks, premature motherhood presumably leads to truncated education, 
remaining unmarried, lower future family income, and larger completed family size (Senderowitz 
and Paxman 1985, Ferré, 2009). Moreover, teens’ child bearing has a negative inter-generational 
externality on newborns. Studies show that children of teen mothers face inferior socioeconomics 
outcomes in future including risks of developmental delay, academic difficulties, behavioral 
disorders, early sexual activity, depression, and becoming adolescent parents themselves (Nord 
et.al 1992, Hoffman and Maynard 2008, Klein 2005). 
Among developed countries, the United States has always had one of the highest adolescent 
pregnancy rates especially in the early 1990s. In 2005, there were about 10.4 million young women 
aged 15-19 in the United States who bore 10% of the country’s 4.1 million annual births. However, 
this ratio has been cut in half to 5% by 2017.1 According to population data released by the Centers 
                                                          
1 If we assume a roughly stable miscarriage rate, teens’ birth rate is composed of the rate at which teens become pregnant and the rate of aborting 





for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the overall birth rate for females aged 15–19 years in 
the United States declined by 53 percent from 39.7 births per 1,000 women in 2005 to 18.8 in 
2017. The birth rate is falling faster for teens aged 15-17 (63 percent) than for teens aged 18-19 
(49 percent).  
Table 1 breaks down the U.S. adolescents’ birth rate by age, race, and ethnicity. All 
categories have had a similar decline in birth rates, but teenage birth rates still reflect a wide 
disparity by race/ethnicity. White teens’ fertility rate is as twice as high as the Asian or Pacific 
Islander teens’ and almost half of African Americans’. Hispanic teenagers' birth rate is still two 
times greater than non-Hispanics’, but the gap has been slightly decreasing.  
A number of behavioral changes have been cited for the downward trend in the U.S. teen 
childbearing in general, including delayed initiation of first sex, decreased sexual activity, 
increases in the use of effective contraception and practices, as well as increases in teen pregnancy 
prevention programs and expanded access to Medicaid family planning services (Kearney and 
Levine 2009, Kearney and Levine 2012, Ventura et.al 2014, Abma and Martinez 2017, Matthews 
and Hamilton 2018). This paper examines how local 2-year and 4-year colleges could influence 
teens’ birth rate in the United States. 
2.1 Previous Literature  
Many studies have revealed a negative relationship between women’s higher educational 
level and their fertility (LeVine 1987, Currie and Moretti 2003, Breierova and Duflo 2004, Osili 
and Long 2008, McCrary and Royer 2011). In fact, Basu (2002) claims that studies of fertility 
                                                          
suggesting that the declines in U.S. teens’ birth rates are driven entirely by declines in pregnancies, not increases in abortion (Jatlaoui et. al 2015, 





unanimously agreed on two of the strongest reasons for reduced fertility. One reason is increased 
gender equality, which enhances women’s control over resources and their own lives. The other 
major factor is education, which may play an even more important role by informing women’s 
choices and giving them the confidence needed to act on these choices (Jejeebhoy 1995).  
According to the standard economic theory of opportunity cost, women’s higher education 
decreases their fertility rate because more educated women have higher opportunity costs of 
bearing children in terms of forgone present and future income. For such reasons, births are often 
thought to be especially costly for teenagers who are in the early stages of human capital 
development. Osili and Long (2008) found that increasing female education by one year reduces 
early fertility by 0.26 births. Education also affects women’s fertility rate indirectly by lowering 
child mortality rate (Breierova and Duflo 2004) and raising women’s marital aspirations (Jeffery 
and Basu 1996, Basu 1999). Attending school modernizes girls’ attitudes about the quality of life 
they would like to have, including their marital life and the type of man they would like to marry 
(Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, Goldin 1992). These factors all together result in a lower fertility 
rate for women with higher education.  
However, the fertility-education relationship is not a one-way path. Raising a child 
sacrifices time and effort which could be spent on education. In case of teenagers, Moore and 
Waite (1977) report that early childbearing is strongly associated with lower educational 
attainment, even when other factors associated with school achievement are considered; the young 
mothers are never able to catch up educationally with their former classmates who postponed 
childbearing. However, more recent studies (see Hotz et.al 2005) argue that although early 
childbearing has some adverse consequences on teen mothers in short-run, teen mothers’ long-





adulthood. Moreover, they find that by their late twenties, teen mothers appear to be better off in 
some aspects of their lives. Note that this potential reverse causality makes it difficult to establish 
a causal link between education and fertility. 
Rouse (1995) evaluated the effect of community colleges on educational attainment. She 
found that closer community colleges marginally increase rate of aggregate years of schooling. 
Shee also stated that more accessible community colleges do not change the likelihood of attaining 
a bachelor’s degree. 
Although the adverse impact of education on young women's fertility is well established 
(Martin 1995, Geruso and Royer 2018), little research has been reported on the effect of 2-year 
college education on women's fertility. This is unfortunate because there are several reasons to 
think that 2-year colleges may have a different effect than 4-year colleges, including the simple 
fact that 2-year colleges tend to attract students from the local area, especially those with lower 
attachment to the educational system, lower educational aspirations, and higher lifetime fertility 
(Pascarella et. al 1998, Stewart 2003). The main paper which has investigated the issue at all is by 
Currie and Moretti (2003), who examined the effects of the openings of 2-year and 4-year college 
between 1940-1990 to see if women’s educational attainment improves the health of their children. 
They found that women’s higher educational attainment due to college availability in the mother’s 
17th year increased child health by decreasing the women’s total fertility, though this was not the 
primary focus of their study. They only focused on white women of any ages.  
In this paper, I use more recent data to explore the effect of college availability on birth 
rate of girls aged 15-19 more fully by their race. There are several reasons to believe that the 





rapid expansion of number of colleges, increases in the educational attainment of women over the 
last three decades, changes in sociological and legal aspects of fertility, and changes in the 
availability, prevalence, and effectiveness of contraceptive methods. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
The following thought experiment illustrates some ways in which teenagers’ fertility may 
respond to the opening of a new local 2-year college, or more generally, a reduction in tuition. 
Begin by categorizing teenage girls into four groups defined by their intentions toward attending 
post-secondary education and type of school. Group A are teenagers who would attend a 4-year 
college whether a new 2-year college opens or not. Group B consists of students who would attend 
a 4-year college if access to 2-year colleges did not increase but would instead choose to attend a 
local 2-year college if it became easier or less expensive to do so. The third group (group C) 
consists of students who will not attend any type of college unless access increases, but who would 
attend a 2-year college if one opened locally. Finally, group D includes those who will not enroll 
in post-secondary education in any event. 
Now consider how each of those groups may respond to a new 2-year college in their local 
area. The change would not change the educational decisions of groups A and D, but it is still 
possible that their fertility decisions may be affected indirectly. For example, they may become 
more likely to get pregnant if the local population of young men increases. 
The educational decisions of groups B and C would change, however, and it may affect 
their fertility rates in opposite directions. Establishing more local 2-year colleges will probably 
decrease fertility in group C for the usual reasons of less current time and higher opportunity cost. 





for two reasons. First, they will spend less time in school and maybe have a lower opportunity cost 
of childbirth later on. Second, attending a more local school means they are more likely to maintain 
existing social relationships that may raise their chance of pregnancy. Note that although women 
in group B are downgrading their level of education, this decision would still presumably raise 
their utility, as they are voluntarily choosing this option over 4-year college. 
I speculate that the decrease in the fertility of group C would exceed the increase in the 
fertility of teenagers in group B. Because teenagers in group C are more likely to have lower 
educational aspirations than group B; and studies show that teenagers with modest educational and 
occupational aspirations are more likely exposed to early motherhood as they have not much to 
lose by giving birth (Stewart 2003). However, the locality of educational institution can change all 
the equations and increases teenagers’ fertility if teens decide to stay in their family home after 
their babies are born and take advantage of family help and financial support (Unger and Cooley 
1992, Frost et. al 2001, Geronimus 1997). 
In addition to change in number of schools, a change in tuition might affect teenagers birth 
decision. Lower cost of college attendance will lead to both a substitution effect and an income 
effect. If the income effect of lowering 2-year schools’ tuition overcomes the substitution effect, 
assuming kids as normal good then teenagers birth rate may go up. Cheaper associate degrees also 
could increase adolescents’ interactions with the opposite sex in a county. It means that not only 
county’s teenagers, either male or female, are less likely to leave the county to attend a college, 
but also more male and female teenagers may immigrate to the county to take advantage of cheaper 
associate degrees. Staying in the county could mean still living in their parents’ home and keeping 





the effect of opening a new community college on teens’ birth rate, we need to know whom 
community colleges serve. 
 
3.1 Whom do community colleges serve? 
In fall 2015, 17.0 million undergraduate students attended degree-granting postsecondary 
institutions in the United States. The 10.5 million of them (62 percent) enrolled at 4-year 
institutions and 6.5 million (38 percent) at 2-year institutions (see Table 2).  
Students’ age structure was slightly different between 2-year and 4-year institutions. In 
both types of schools, 31 to 32 percent of students were younger than 20. Compared to 4-year 
institutions, the percentage of students who were in their twenties (54 percent) was 9 percent lower 
in 2-years schools (45 percent). Apparently, the percentage of students over 30 is 8 percent higher 
in 2-year institutions (23 percent) than 4-year institutions (15 percent). In both types of institutions, 
females are in the majority, with 56 and 57 percent of students respectively. Most of the students 
in 2-year colleges are enrolled part-time. The percentage of part time students at 2-year institutions 
(61 percent) was more than twice as high as the percentages 4-year institutions (23 percent).  
The distribution of U.S. resident undergraduate students (either full-time or part-time) by 
racial and ethnic groups varied to some extent among 2-year and 4-year institutions. In 2015, 50 
percent of undergraduate students at 2-year institutions were White, which was lower than the 
percentages of White students at 4-year institutions (58 percent). The percentage of students who 
were Black in both institutions are about the same (13 to14 percent). 24 percent of undergraduate 
students enrolled in 2-year institutions were Hispanic, but only 14 percent in 4-year intuitions. 





than at 4-year intuitions, while other ethnicities (especially Whites and Asians) enrolled mostly at 
4-year institutions.  
Since this study asks how local 2-year colleges influence adolescents’ fertility, I 
particularly focus on two age categories: under 18 and 18-19 years old2 attending postsecondary 
colleges. Considering the age structure of colleges students shown in table 3, it is noteworthy that 
2-year institutions are more popular for students under age 18.  Of 1 million undergraduate students 
younger than 18, 61 percent (0.6 million) chose 2-year institution for a postsecondary education 
and 39 percent (0.4 million) of them attend 4-year schools. (The majority of students (66 percent) 
aged 18 and 19 registered in a 4-year institution.) Furthermore, 80 percent of students aged under 
18 attended the school part-time and 90 percent of them went to public schools regardless of the 
school’s program (4-year or 2-year). (For students aged 18 and 19, 17 percent of students attended 
the school part-time, and 79 percent went to the public schools. Males and females under 18 are 
both are more interested in part-time education than those aged 18 and 19.) Moreover, even if most 
of those under 18 are not currently enrolled in a 2-year school, their fertility may still be affected 
by the presence of such a school, either because it represents an option for the future or because it 
increases the number of young men in the local area. 
The cost of education is one of the biggest factors in deciding on whether attending a post-
secondary education and at what level. Attending a public 2-year school is the cheapest option, 
especially if students live with their families.  Tuition and fees comprise the main part of cost of 
education, although they vary across the states.  
 
                                                          
2 Based on  Digest of Education (2015),Table 303.50, only 0.02 percent of students aged under 18 and 0.02 percent of students aged 18-19 attended 





4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Empirical Specification 
The empirical analysis uses a difference-in-difference methodology to investigate the effects of 
local 2-year colleges on teens’ birth rates. For county c, state s, year t, the reduced-form model of 
teens’ birth rate is modelled as: 
 
𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑐𝑠(𝑡+1) = 𝛿1𝐷2𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷4𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡+ 𝛼𝑐 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 ∗ 𝑡 + ℰ𝑐𝑠𝑡                      (1)   
 
where 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑐𝑠(𝑡+1) is the log of teens’ birth rate in a county at time t+1. 𝜏𝑡 and 𝛼𝑐 are respectively 
the year and county fixed effects needed for the difference-in-differences framework, and  ℰ𝑐𝑠𝑡 is 
the error term. 
The key explanatory variables are 𝐷2𝑐𝑠𝑡  and 𝐷4𝑐𝑠𝑡 , which measure accessibility and 
affordability of 2-year and 4-year colleges. 𝐷2𝑐𝑠𝑡 is a vector describing the 2-year colleges: the 
number of 2-year schools in a county, a dummy variable indicating the size of those 2-year 
colleges, a continuous variable indicating the average tuition and fees of 2-year colleges in the 
state, a dummy variable representing size of the county, and interaction between each pair of those 
variables. 𝐷4𝑐𝑠𝑡 consists of the same variables for the 4-year colleges. Thus, from equation (1), 𝛿1 
measures the overall effect on teenagers’ birth rate of improving 2-year college accessibility (either 
by increasing the number of colleges or reducing tuition), conditional on other covariates. 






𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡 are county-specific covariates to control for aspects of the neighborhood context that 
are not constant over time. Studies show that unfavorable socioeconomic conditions are tightly 
linked to the subsequent rate of early childbearing; so that young people growing up in 
disadvantaged socioeconomics circumstances are more likely to have a child during adolescence 
(Kearney and Levine 2012, Penman-Aguilar et.al 2013, Lindberg and Orr 2011). Thus, I consider 
the role of some economic covariates, including percentage of people in the county living below 
the poverty level, the unemployment rate of high school graduates aged 25-64, and log of median 
monthly housing costs in the model. According to those existing studies, I expect that higher 
unemployment rates and a greater percentage of people below the poverty level increases teens’ 
birth rate.  I also include a set of demographic controls for the racial/ethnic composition of the 
county population in the model, and the sex-ratio of population aged 15–29.  
Finally, the remaining term ( 𝛾𝑐 ∗ 𝑡 ) is a vector of county specific-time trends. This 
addresses the possibility that on-going trends in the birth rate may be correlated with changes in 
the number or cost of colleges. Thus, the effects of new colleges or changes in tuition are identified 
by the difference between the local birth rates that actually occur in the following year and those 
that would have been expected if the on-going local trend had continued. 
To detect if opening of new 2-year colleges could have different influences on teens based 
on their age, race, or ethnicity, I estimated the effect of opening a local school on total teen’s birth 
rates (aged 15–19 years), younger teen’s birth rates (aged 15–17 years), and older teen’s birth rates 








This paper uses data incorporated from multiple sources. Counties are the units of 
observation because they are the smallest local units for which number of establishments of 2-year 
schools and teens’ fertility rates are available. Every year, Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data 
for the annual number of establishment and employment for both 2-year and 4-year colleges.3 In 
this paper, I used the annual number of establishments as proxy of the number of colleges in a 
county from 2005 to 2017. I focused only on public 2-year schools for several reasons: public 
schools are the object of public policies; marginal students are more likely to go to public schools; 
the available pricing of the college is more representative of the actual cost for students in public 
schools; and as table 3 shows, few teenaged students attend private 2-year colleges. However, I 
used data on both public and private 4-year schools. 
Data used for tuition is the average published tuition and fees for public universities in that 
state, measured in 2012 Dollars. This information comes from the U.S. Department of Education, 
National Center for Education Statistics, Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) 
and Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 
Data on county-level teens’ birth rates for the years 2005-2017 was obtained from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In many cases, rates can be disaggregated by 
age, race, and ethnicity. However, to assure confidentiality, the CDC has restricted fertility data to 
counties with a 1990 population greater than 100,000; therefore, this analysis is based on data from 
the 580 most populous U.S. counties. Moreover, CDC birth data are derived from birth certificates, 
and as of 2011, all sub-national vital statistics data representing zero to nine (0-9) births/persons 
                                                          





are suppressed to protect personal privacy. Thus, although I suspect teens’ birth rate in small 
counties are more likely to be affected by opening a new college than bigger counties, the birth 
data availability restriction prevented me from investigating small counties. 
Demographic information, including percentage of Hispanic population in a county or 
share of a specific race from the entire population in a county also came from CDC data. Other 
data used in the model, including percentage of population below the poverty line, unemployment 
rate, and median monthly housing cost came from the United States Census Bureau.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4 summarizes number of 2-year and 4-year schools in 580 investigated counties by 
counties’ size, population and whether they have ever had a sort of college. Across all counties, 
93 of them (16 percent) have never had a public 2-year school during this period, and 125 of them 
(22 percent) have never had a public 4-year school. Since distance from the school might play a 
noticeable role for students to prefer a local college, I have broken counties into 10 deciles based 
on their size in square miles.  
Table 4 shows that about 25 percent of counties that fall within the second to the forth 
decile have never had a public 2-year college, and 30 percent of them have never had a 4-year 
public school. However, as data shows, almost all investigated counties in this study have had a 
sort of college. There were only 4 counties that they have never had any sort of colleges in there. 
As opening a new college in a more populous county may affect birth rate more than a same size 





four quartiles. 58 percent of counites that have never had a public 2-year school falls within the 
first quartile. 
Table 5 reports mean births per 1000 women aged 15-29 by race, ethnicity and county 
mean size across studied counties. Mean birth rate for Hispanic teenagers is greater than Non-
Hispanic ones, especially in early ages of 15-17. Among teenagers with different races, Black teens 
have the highest birth rate and whites have the lowest.  Since the mean birth rate for Native 
Americans and Asian or Pacific Islanders from the sample I used (table 5) is very different from 
the mean birth rate of these races in the United States (table 3), I will not interpret any regression 
coefficients of these two races. Table 5 also shows that teenagers’ mean birth rate in counties that 
have had a 2-year college is about 5 birth per 1000 women higher than those that have never had 
a 2-year college. Similarly, the mean birth rate of younger teenagers aged 15-17 is about 3 birth 
per 1000 higher in counties with a 4-year school compare to counties that have never had a 4-year 
college. However, the data show that having a 4-year college in the county has coincided with a 
lower mean birth rate among teenagers aged 18-19. 
 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
In this section, I discuss estimates of the effects of availability of a local 2-year college on 
the fertility rate of teenagers. Estimated mean marginal elasticities and standard errors from 
difference-in-difference regressions are displayed in table 6a of the appendix. Findings indicate 
that it is important to distinguish between the availability and affordability of 2-year schools. While 
opening a new local 2-year school does not have a statistically significant effect on the fertility 
rate of teenagers, 2-year schools’ tuition and fees inversely affects teenagers’ birth decision. 





due to the fact that birth rates of teenagers in small counties, which are more likely to be affected 
by opening a new college, were censored from the sample by CDC in order to provide privacy.  
According to the regression results, the teenagers’ 2-year school tuition elasticity of birth 
rate is -0.27. This effect does not change by ethnicity, but it does by race. White teenagers’ demand 
for a child is more sensitive to change in 2-year school tuition compared to Black teenagers. 
Results also show that as the size or the population of a county goes up, teenagers’ birth decision 
would be less sensitive to 2-year schools’ tuition.  The 2-year school tuition elasticity of birth 
ranges between -0.39 and -0.13 from the smallest counties to the largest ones.  
As table 6a shows that opening a new 2-year school in a county has different, statistically 
significant effects on Hispanic and Non-Hispanic teenagers. Although the effects on each ethnic 
group are almost equal in size, they are opposite in direction; Higher availability of 2-year schools 
lowers Hispanic teenagers’ birth rate and increases Non-Hispanics’ birth rate. Hispanic teenagers’ 
birth decision is also sensitive to the tuition of 4-year schools. More expensive local 4-year schools 
increase their probability of being a teen mother.  
Table 6b breaks down the effect of availability and affordability of 2-year schools on the 
birth rate of younger teenagers (aged 15-17) and older teenagers (18-19). Both groups respond in 
the same way to changes in tuition. Both increase their birth rate when they must pay less to attend 
a 2-year school, especially in smaller and less populated counties.  The only difference is that the 
younger women in any race, ethnicity group, and county size are more sensitive to change in tuition 
than the older.  Despite their same reaction to the tuition, younger teens respond to the change in 
number of 2-year school in their county differently from the older teens. Increasing the number of 
2-year schools’ availability positively affects the birth rate of teenagers aged 15-17 and negatively 





ethnicity, and size of the county they are living in shows that the effect of 2-year college 
availability on birth rates is statistically significant only on large and populous counties. Among 
different demographic groups, the change in the number of 2-year colleges has a statistically 
significant effect on the birth rate of older teenagers among Whites and Hispanics.  
Table 6c represents how school availability and affordability at the time that women were 
18 years old may affect their birth decision when they are in their twenties. Results show that 
opening a new public 2-year school in a county keep decreases teenagers’ birth rate (especially for 
Hispanics) until they will be 24 years old. However, this effect will not last longer and the number 
of 2-year schools does not have a statistically significant effect on a teenager’s birth rate in their 
late twenties. The only exception is for teenagers living in the second decile county size who will 
have a higher birth rate between 25-29 if they have had more 2-year colleges around. In addition 
to 2-year schools, having more public 4-year school around will also affect future birth rate of 
teenagers living in the smallest county size. Although their current birth rate is not influenced by 
number of 4-year schools, they decrease their birth rate in their early twenties and postpone it to 
their late twenties.  
Although it is easy to imagine that higher costs of attending school may lead teenagers to 
postpone their fertility, Table 6c shows tuition of 2-year schools does not have a significant effect 
on teenagers’ future birth rate. Hispanics and Blacks are exceptions, however: more expensive 
associate degrees decrease both of those groups’ birth rates until the age of 24, but they increase 
Blacks’ birth rates in their late twenties considerably. Although tuition of public 4-year schools 
does not significantly affect teenagers’ current birth rates, it positively affects their future birth 








This study has attempted to reveal the role that local 2-year colleges may play on the birth 
rate of teenagers.  It has brought to light the fact that in case of counties with a 1990 population 
greater than 100,000, the effect of 2-year schools on teenagers’ birth decision is mainly a matter 
of affordability than availability. Availability of local 2-year colleges affects younger teenagers 
different from the older. While the birth rate of teenagers aged 15-17 increases with opening a new 
2-year college in a county, the birth rate of teenagers aged 18-19 drops. However, either increase 
or decrease, these effects are too small. The reason of this small effect could back to the size of 
counites in the data set used.  
Despite the small effect of college availability on the birth decision of teenagers, college 
affordability in form of the change in tuition affects teenagers’ birth rate considerably. Although 
teenagers from all racial/ethnic/ age groups respond the same to the change in tuition, impacts on 
younger teenagers is greater than older, on white teenagers more than blacks, and on teenagers 
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Table 1: U.S. Adolescents' birth per 1000 women, by race and ethnicity 
  2005  2017 
  15-17 18-19 15-19  15-17 18-19 15-19 
United States 21.1 68.4 39.7  7.8 35.1 18.8 
Race 
   
 
   
    White 18.8 64.0 36.7  7.1 33.2 17.6 
    Black  34.5 101.2 60.1  13.0 52.5 28.7 
    Native American 26.3 78.0 46.0  10.3 39.4 21.9 
    Asian or Pacific Islander 7.7 26.4 15.4  2.5 12.5 6.6 
    
 
   
Ethnicity 
   
 
   
     Hispanic 45.8 124.2 76.5  13.6 52.7 28.9 
     Not Hispanic or Latino 15.7 56.4 31.8  6.0 29.7 15.6 












Table 2: Undergraduate fall enrollment in degree-granting postsecondary institutions in 2015 
Selected student characteristic 
   Percentage 
Total 4-year 2-year Total 4-year 2-year 
Total undergrad 17.0 10.5 6.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Age       
   under 18 1.1 0.4 0.6 6.2 3.9 9.9 
   18-19 4.3 2.9 1.5 25.5 27.3 22.5 
   20-24 6.7 4.7 2.0 39.5 44.4 31.5 
   25-29 1.8 1.0 0.9 10.8 9.4 13.1 
   30-34 1.0 0.6 0.5 6.1 5.2 7.5 
   over 35 or Age unknown 2.0 1.0 1.0 11.9 9.9 15.3 
Sex       
  Male  7.5 4.7 2.8 44.0 44.4 43.4 
  Female 9.5 5.9 3.7 56.0 55.6 56.6 
Attendance status       
  Full-time 10.6 8.1 2.5 62.2 76.7 38.7 
  Part-time 6.4 2.5 4.0 37.8 23.3 61.3 
Race/ethnicity       
  White  9.3 6.1 3.2 54.6 57.6 49.7 
  Black  2.3 1.4 0.9 13.6 13.0 14.4 
  Hispanic  3.0 1.5 1.6 17.9 14.2 23.9 
  Asian 1.0 0.7 0.4 6.1 6.2 5.9 
  Pacific Islander  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  American Indian/Alaska Native 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.7 1.0 
  Two or more races  0.6 0.4 0.2 3.5 3.6 3.3 
  Nonresident alien  0.6 0.5 0.1 3.3 4.4 1.6 








Table 3: Fall enrollment in degree-granting undergraduate institutions, 2015  
  Under 18 18 and 19 Under 18 18 and 19 
Fall enrollment  1.1 4.3 100.0 100.0 
4-year  0.4 2.9 38.9 66.3 
   Public  0.3 2.0 29.3 46.1 
   Private-nonprofit 0.1 0.8 9.2 19.1 
   Private-for profit 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.1 
2-year 0.6 1.5 61 34 
   Public  0.6 1.4 61 33 
   Private-nonprofit 0.0 0.0 0 0 
   Private-for profit 0.0 0.0 0 1 
Full-time 0.2 3.6 20 83 
   Public  0.2 2.7 16 63 
   Private-nonprofit 0.0 0.8 4 19 
   Private-for profit 0.0 0.1 0 1 
Part-time 0.8 0.7 80 17 
   Public  0.8 0.7 75 16 
   Private-nonprofit 0.1 0.0 6 1 
   Private-for profit 0.0 0.0 0 0 
Full-time 0.2 3.6 20 83 
   2-year 0.1 0.9 7 21 
   4-year 0.1 2.7 12 62 
Part-time 0.8 0.7 80 17 
   2-year 0.6 0.6 54 13 
   4-year 0.3 0.2 27 4 
   Female-Full-time 0.1 2.0 12 46 
   Female-Part-time 0.5 0.4 47 9 
   Male-Full-time 0.1 1.6 8 37 
   Male-Part-time 0.4 0.3 33 8 






Table 4: Number of counties, by type of colleges, size and mean population 
 
Total  
Number of counties have ever had 
a  
Number of counties have never 













Overall 580 487 549 455 93 31 125 




       
 1st decile 162 52 49 47 46 3 5 6 
 2nd decile 358 68 52 66 43 16 2 25 
 3rd decile 502 64 49 62 48 15 2 16 
 4th decile 599 65 47 61 46 18 4 19 
 5th decile 690 62 52 58 43 10 4 19 
 6th decile 813 58 51 55 44 7 3 14 
 7th decile 927 52 51 48 47 1 4 5 
 8th decile 1,170 55 49 52 49 6 3 6 
 9th decile 1,725 51 41 48 43 10 3 8 
 10th decile 5,810 53 46 52 46 7 1 7 
 
        
By county mean population 
County quartile mean population 
  
    
 
1st quartile      138,862  219 165 191 146 54 28 73 
2nd quartile      235,760  153 123 151 118 30 2 35 
3rd quartile      464,340  115 107 114 104 8 1 11 
4th quartile   1,507,755  93 92 93 87 1 0 6 












15-17 18-19 20-24 25-29 15-17 18-19 20-24 25-29 
Overall 21.1 68.4 101.4 121.1 10.1 37.4 73.6 104.0 
 Hispanic  62.4 99.7 180.7 159.5 17.6 62.7 104.9 127.0 
 Non-Hispanic 16.2 57.8 89.9 114.5 8.2 33.1 67.1 100.0 
 White  18.4 62.0 96.5 121.7 9.0 33.7 68.1 102.7 
 Black  37.7 109.5 135.2 113.9 15.7 61.1 102.5 112.5 
 Native American  169.3 268.2 152.1 254.1 20.6 67.1 90.0 91.6 
 Asian or Pacific Islander  23.0 96.0 74.2 120.3 27.2 67.6 70.5 102.9 
 1st decile 26.8 70.1 92.4 102.1 11.7 35.6 66.5 92.0 
 2nd decile 18.3 59.0 90.5 121.0 9.4 33.7 64.8 103.9 
 3rd decile 18.3 60.4 92.9 117.3 8.9 34.0 66.8 101.0 
 4th decile 17.3 59.1 92.1 122.6 9.5 36.0 72.4 107.9 
 5th decile 19.5 67.4 103.5 125.3 10.0 36.4 74.4 107.6 
 6th decile 18.5 65.1 98.6 115.9 9.2 34.8 70.6 99.8 
 7th decile 22.8 73.4 106.1 123.6 10.5 39.5 78.1 106.9 
 8th decile 22.2 74.9 106.3 119.8 8.9 41.4 79.6 102.4 
 9th decile 21.2 74.1 112.3 130.5 10.7 40.4 82.0 112.3 
 10th decile 25.7 80.8 119.2 132.7 12.3 42.3 81.5 106.7 
Has a county ever had a 2-year college 
Yes 21.7 69.4 101.8 120.9 10.2 37.6 73.9 103.2 
No 17.8 63.1 98.9 122.4 9.5 36.1 71.8 108.0 
Has a county ever had a 4-year college 
Yes 21.1 68.2 101.2 121.0 10.0 37.1 73.1 103.6 
No 18.6 87.5 124.4 133.7 13.7 51.3 95.2 122.5 
Data Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 








Table 6a: Estimated mean marginal elasticity of county teen's aged 15-19 birth rates with respect to current number of schools and tuition 
 
Number of Schools   Tuition 
   2-year-public 4-year-Public  4-year-Private 
 
2-year-public 4-year-Public 4-year-Private 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Overall 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
 
***-0.27 0.04 *0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.05 
Hispanic ***-0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
 
***-0.21 0.05 **0.08 0.04 -0.09 0.06 
Non-Hispanic ***0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 
***-0.20 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
By race 
             
White -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 
***-0.29 0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.06 
Black 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
 
**-0.20 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 
By county population 
             
1st quartile  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
***-0.35 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
2nd quartile  0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
***-0.34 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
3rd quartile 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
***-0.33 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
4rd quartile 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.03 
 
***-0.23 0.04 *0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.05 
By minimum number of schools 
           
0 0.00 0.00 ***-0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
***-0.35 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
1 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
 
***-0.32 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.05 
2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 
***-0.33 0.05 *0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.05 
3 & 4 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
 
***-0.29 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.05 
+5 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.03 
 








Table 6a: Estimated mean marginal elasticity of county teen's aged 15-19 birth rates with respect to current number of schools and tuition(continued) 
 
Number of Schools   Tuition 
   2-year-public 4-year-Public  4-year-Private 
 
2-year-public 4-year-Public 4-year-Private 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
By County Size 
             
1 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 
 
***-0.39 0.06 *0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.06 
2 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.06 
 
***-0.36 0.06 *0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.05 
3 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.01 **-0.14 0.07 
 
***-0.36 0.06 *0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.05 
4 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.02 *0.05 0.02 
 
***-0.34 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
5 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
 
***-0.33 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
6 0.11 0.07 **-0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 
 
***-0.31 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.05 
7 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.04 
 
***-0.25 0.04 *0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.05 
8 0.01 0.02 ***0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 
 
***-0.28 0.04 *0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.05 
9 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 *-0.07 0.03 
 
***-0.20 0.05 *0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
10 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.08 
 
***-0.13 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.04 
Note:  Regression also controls for some county-level demographic and economic covariates including percentage of people living below the poverty level, the 
unemployment rate, and housing cost.   
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1%  









Table 6b: Estimated mean marginal elasticity of county teen's birth rates with respect to age, number of schools, and tuition 
 
Number of Schools   Tuition 
   2-year-public 4-year-Public  4-year-Private 
 
2-year-public 4-year-Public 4-year-Private 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
By Age 
       
  
     
15-17 ***0.06 0.02 0.00 0.02 **-0.06 0.03 
 
***-0.28 0.07 **0.14 0.06 -0.06 0.08 
18-19 **-0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 
***-0.20 0.04 **0.09 0.04 *-0.09 0.05 
By age and County population 
           
15-17  1st quartile   0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
***-0.36 0.09 **0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.08 
 
 2nd quartile   0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
***-0.35 0.08 **0.14 0.07 -0.05 0.08 
 
 3rd quartile  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
 
***-0.35 0.08 **0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.08 
 
 4rd quartile  ***0.08 0.03 0.00 0.03 **-0.10 0.04 
 
***-0.25 0.07 **0.13 0.06 -0.06 0.08 
18-19  1st quartile   0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 
***-0.27 0.05 **0.09 0.05 *-0.09 0.05 
 
 2nd quartile   0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 
***-0.25 0.04 **0.09 0.04 *-0.09 0.05 
 
 3rd quartile  -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 *-0.01 0.01 
 
***-0.25 0.04 **0.09 0.04 *-0.09 0.05 
 
 4rd quartile  **-0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
 
***-0.17 0.04 **0.09 0.04 *-0.10 0.05 
By age and County Size 
           
15-17 1 0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
***-0.41 0.10 **0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.09 
 
2 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.11 0.09 
 
***-0.37 0.09 **0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.08 
 
3 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.01 **-0.27 0.14 
 
***-0.38 0.09 **0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.08 
 
4 -0.09 0.06 *-0.05 0.03 **0.05 0.03 
 








Table 6b: Estimated mean marginal elasticity of county teen's birth rates with respect to age, number of schools, and tuition (continued) 
 
Number of Schools   Tuition 
   2-year-public 4-year-Public  4-year-Private 
 
2-year-public 4-year-Public 4-year-Private 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
        
By age and County Size 
       
15-17 5 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.09 *-0.09 0.05  ***-0.34 0.08 **0.15 0.07 -0.05 0.08 
 6 **0.25 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.12  ***-0.33 0.08 **0.16 0.07 -0.06 0.08 
 7 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.07  ***-0.26 0.06 **0.14 0.07 -0.06 0.08 
 8 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04  ***-0.30 0.07 **0.13 0.06 -0.06 0.08 
 9 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 **-0.10 0.04  ***-0.22 0.07 **0.14 0.07 -0.05 0.08 
 10 **0.11 0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.16 0.10  ***-0.14 0.05 **0.09 0.05 -0.05 0.07 
18-19 1 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.05 
 
***-0.29 0.05 **0.10 0.05 *-0.11 0.06 
 
2 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
 
***-0.27 0.05 **0.10 0.05 *-0.09 0.05 
 
3 -0.01 0.03 ***-0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.05 
 
***-0.27 0.05 **0.10 0.05 *-0.10 0.05 
 
4 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 
 
***-0.25 0.05 **0.10 0.05 *-0.09 0.05 
 
5 *-0.05 0.03 **-0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
 
***-0.24 0.04 **0.09 0.05 *-0.09 0.05 
 
6 -0.01 0.06 **-0.07 0.03 0.00 0.02 
 
***-0.23 0.04 **0.10 0.05 *-0.09 0.05 
 
7 -0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.05 
 
***-0.18 0.03 **0.09 0.04 *-0.09 0.05 
 
8 0.00 0.02 ***0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 
***-0.21 0.04 **0.08 0.04 *-0.09 0.05 
 
9 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
 









10 ***-0.15 0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.11 0.07 
 
***-0.09 0.03 **0.07 0.03 **-0.09 0.05 
By race and age 
           
White-15-17 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 **-0.07 0.03 
 
***-0.30 0.09  *0.13  
       
0.08  -0.02 0.10 
White-18-19 ***-0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 
***-0.21 0.05 *0.09 0.05 *-0.10 0.05 
Black-15-17 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.05 
 
***-0.29 0.11 **0.23 0.10 *0.16 0.09 
Black-18-19 0.03 0.02 *-0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 
 
**-0.14 0.07 0.09 0.07 **0.15 0.07 
Hispanic-15-17 -0.05 0.04 0.00 0.05 **-0.10 0.05 
 
***-0.20 0.08 *0.10 0.06 0.06 0.10 
Hispanic-18-19 ***-0.10 0.03 ***-0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 
 
***-0.20 0.05 *0.08 0.04 **-0.15 0.06 
Non-Hispanic-15-17 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.04 
 
***-0.25 0.09 **0.22 0.10 -0.05 0.11 
Non-Hispanic-18-19 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 
***-0.14 0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.06 
Note:  Regression also controls for some county-level demographic and economic covariates including percentage of people living below the poverty level, the unemployment rate, and housing cost.   
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1%  












Table 6c: Marginal effect of school availability and tuition at the time that women were 18 on current birth rate of women aged 20-29 
 
 Change in Number of Schools   Tuition 
2-year-public   4-year-Public        4-year-Private 
 
2-year-public     4-year-Public         4-year-Private 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
20-24 **-0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 ***0.03 0.01  -0.03 0.03 **0.05 0.03 ***-0.07 0.02 
25-29 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.04 0.03 **0.08 0.03 0.02 0.03 
20-24 Hispanic ***-0.06 0.02 *-0.02 0.01 **0.04 0.02  ***-0.11 0.04 ***0.08 0.03 ***-0.11 0.04 
 
Non-Hispanic -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01  0.01 0.03 ***0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
25-29 Hispanic *0.08 0.05 *-0.02 0.01 ***-0.08 0.02  0.04 0.06 **0.11 0.05 0.08 0.06 
 
Non-Hispanic 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.02 0.03 **0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.03 
20-24 White *-0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 *0.02 0.01  -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 ***-0.08 0.03 
 
Black 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01  ***-0.12 0.05 **0.11 0.04 -0.06 0.04 
25-29 White 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01  -0.04 0.04 *0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 
Black 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02  ***0.25 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.05 
20-24 1st decile 0.00 0.01 ***-0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.03  -0.05 0.04 **0.07 0.03 ***-0.09 0.03 
 
2nd decile -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01  -0.04 0.03 **0.07 0.03 ***-0.08 0.02 
 
3rd decile 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.03  -0.04 0.03 **0.07 0.03 ***-0.08 0.02 
 
4th decile -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01  -0.04 0.03 **0.07 0.03 ***-0.07 0.02 
 
5th decile -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 **-0.03 0.01  -0.04 0.03 **0.07 0.03 ***-0.07 0.02 
 
6th decile 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03  -0.04 0.03 **0.07 0.03 ***-0.08 0.02 
 









8th decile -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02  -0.03 0.03 **0.06 0.02 ***-0.07 0.02 
 
9th decile 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01  -0.02 0.03 **0.06 0.03 ***-0.07 0.02 
 
10th decile ***-0.07 0.03 0.00 0.04 ***0.13 0.03  -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 ***-0.07 0.02 
Table 6c: Marginal effect of school availability and tuition at the time that women were 18 on current birth rate of women aged 20-29 (continued) 
 
 Change in Number of Schools   Tuition 
2-year-public   4-year-Public        4-year-Private 
 
2-year-public     4-year-Public         4-year-Private 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
              
25-29 1st decile -0.01 0.04 **0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03  0.03 0.04 **0.08 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 
2nd decile **0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03  0.01 0.04 **0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 
3rd decile -0.01 0.03 **-0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03  0.02 0.04 **0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
4th decile -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02  0.04 0.04 **0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 
 
5th decile -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.02 **0.03 0.02  0.02 0.03 **0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 
6th decile -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02  0.04 0.03 **0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
7th decile -0.03 0.03 *0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.04  0.02 0.03 **0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 
8th decile 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.02 0.03 **0.07 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 
9th decile 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04  **0.08 0.03 **0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 
  10th decile *0.21 0.12 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.04   **0.04 0.02 **0.08 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
 Note:  Regression also controls for some county-level demographic and economic covariates including percentage of people living below the poverty level, the unemployment rate, and 
housing cost.  * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% Standard Errors are clustered at county levels.  Regression is weighted by representative female 
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